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Introduction
Despite its widespread recognition,' the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is shrouded in mystery. Efforts to devise
workable standards or relevant criteria for determining when the cov* Professor of Law, Whittier Law School. B.S. 1962, University of Pennsylvania;
LL.B. 1965, University of California, Los Angeles; LL.M. 1966, New York University
School of Law.
** Professor of Law, Whittier Law School. A.B. 1968, Harvard College; J.D. 1973,
University of California at Berkeley.
1. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is recognized by the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 205 (1979) ("Every
contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance
and its enforcement."). It is codified by the Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 1-203
(1994) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement."). The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions apply it as a
matter of common law. See, eg., Keffer v. Keffer, 852 P.2d 394,398 (Alaska 1993); Carma
Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d 710,726 (Cal. 1992); Ervin v.
Amoco Oil Co., 885 P.2d 246,250 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Habertz v. Condon, 618 A.2d 501,
505 (Conn. 1992); Southern Business Machs., Inc. v. Norwest Fin. Leasing, Inc., 390 S.E.2d
402, 405 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Abbott v. Amoco Oil Co., 619 N.E.2d 789, 795 (11. App. Ct.
1993); Kansas Baptist Convention v. Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership, 864 P.2d 204, 21011 (Kan. 1993); Blaok v. Chelmsford OB/GYN, 649 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Mass. 1995); Ferrell
v. Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc., 357 N.W.2d 669, 672 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Weldon v. Montana
Bank, 885 P.2d 511, 515 (Mont. 1994); Perry v. Jordan, 900 P.2d 335, 338 (Nev. 1995);
Planning & Design Solutions v. City of Santa Fe, 885 P.2d 628, 635 (N.M. 1994); Dalton v.
Educational Testing Serv., 614 N.Y.S.2d 742, 743 (App. Div. 1994); Bicycle Transit Auth.,
Inc. v. Bell, 333 S.E.2d 299,305 (N.C. 1985); Pacific First Bank v. New Morgan Park Corp.,
876 P.2d 761,762 (Or. 1994); Parker v. Byrd, 420 S.E.2d 850,853 (S.C. 1992); St. Benedict's
Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991); Carmichael v. Adirondack
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enant has been violated have been unavailing. The result is a doctrine
whose application has been ad hoc, yielding inconsistent results and
depriving parties of the ability to predict what conduct will violate the
covenant. 2 This article seeks to provide a structured framework that
would substantially diminish ad hoc decision making. It also seeks to

resolve confusion about when the covenant can be waived and what
remedies the covenant provides.

I.

Overview of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is the residual

gap-filling default rule of contract law. 3 It imposes limits upon one
contracting party's ability to negatively impact the contract's value to
the other contracting party. It determines when a party may no longer
pursue his own self-interest but must instead engage in cooperative
4

behavior by deferring to the other party's contractual interests.

Bottled Gas Corp., 635 A.2d 1211, 1216 (Vt. 1993); Miller v. United States Bank, 865 P.2d
536, 542 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
Only Texas has expressly refused to recognize the covenant's relevance to arms' length
contracts and limited its application to cases in which a special relationship between the
parties is found, such as in insurance contracts. See, e.g., Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875
S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. 1994).
2. For convenience the authors will sometimes refer to the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing as "the covenant of good faith" or "the covenant," and will sometimes use
the term "defendant" when referring to the party who engages in conduct that is alleged to
be in breach of the covenant and the term "plaintiff" when referring to the party who is
adversely affected by that conduct. To avoid confusion that might otherwise arise when
defendant and plaintiff are referred to by pronouns, masculine pronouns will be applied to
defendant and feminine pronouns will be applied to plaintiff.
3. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Marino, 63 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
good faith applies only as a method by which gaps are filled and that good faith is not
applied to block use of terms that actually appear in the contract); Oregon RSA No. 6, Inc.
v. Castle Rock Cellular Ltd. Partnership, 840 F. Supp. 770, 778-79 (D. Or. 1993) (holding
that when the contract is silent as to the permissibility of conduct, the covenant of good
faith may be used to fill the gap); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389 (Cal.
1988) (holding that the duty of good faith is "a kind of safety valve that judges may turn to
fill gaps" in the contract); Jacobs v. Great Pac. Century Corp., 499 A.2d 1023, 1024 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (holding that "an implied covenant can fill a gap in an agreement where the terms of the covenant can be inferred from the subject matter" of the
contract); Bourgeous v. Horizon Healthcare Corp., 872 P.2d 852, 856 (N.M. 1994) (declining to "apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to override express provisions addressed by the terms of an integrated written contract"); Hauer v. Union State
Bank, 532 N.W.2d 456, 464 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that "as a method to fill gaps, it
has little to do with the formation of contracts"); see also Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions in Search of a Standard: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the Employment Context, 57 Mo. L. REv. 1233, 1237 (1992) (recognizing that the covenant of good
faith serves a gap-filling function).
4. It has been recognized that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is designed
to foster cooperation between the parties to a contract.
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Because it is a gap-filling default rule, the covenant applies only

when the propriety of the conduct is not resolved by the terms of the
contract 5 or by another default rule. 6 That situation ordinarily arises
(1) when the contract is silent or ambiguous about the permissibility
of the conduct, 7 or (2) when the conduct is undertaken pursuant to a
grant of discretion and the scope of that discretion has not been desigThe requirement of good faith performance sets parameters for conduct and limits maximization of self-interest by one party when the contract is silent on the
subject. As a general concept and explicit requirement, good faith performance is
a tool used by the courts to police bargains to insure cooperation by one party so
that the other may obtain the expected benefits of the contract.
Sarah H. Jenkins, Abrogation of Surety's Right of Discharge on Release of the Principal
Obligor Under Revised Article 3: A Creditor's Tool for Maximizing Self-Interest, 44 OKLA.
L. REv. 661, 674 (1991).
5. The covenant cannot be used to override or contradict the express terms of the
contract. See General Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 915 F.2d 1038, 1041 (6th Cir.
1990); Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990);
Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 873, 877 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 978 (1989); Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 679 (2d
Cir. 1985); A.I. Transp. v. Imperial Premium Fin., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 345, 348 (D. Utah
1994); Van Arnem Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1220, 1223
(E.D. Mich. 1991); Carma Developers (Cal.) Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d 710,
727 (Cal. 1992); Wells Fargo Realty Advisors Funding, Inc. v. Uioli, Inc., 872 P.2d 1359,
1363 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Neiditz v. Housing Auth., 654 A.2d 812, 819 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1994), affd, 651 A.2d 1295, 1296 (Conn. 1995); Indian Harbor Citrus, Inc. v. Poppell, 658
So. 2d 605, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Peterson v. First Clayton Bank & Trust Co., 447
S.E.2d 63, 66 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holtzman, 618 N.E.2d 418,
424 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993); Waller v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 620 A.2d 381, 388 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1993); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (N.Y. 1983).
6. Even when the conduct at issue is not covered by the terms of the contract, a
default rule other than the covenant of good faith may be used as a gap filler to determine
the permissibility of that conduct. If so, the covenant of good faith would be inapplicable.
For example, a dispute whether the delivery of goods was timely would be resolved by the
U.C.C. default rule, which provides that delivery must be within "a reasonable time."
U.C.C. § 2-309(1) (1994). Similarly, if the quality of goods is in dispute, and the contract
does not specify quality requirements, the issue would be resolved by the U.C.C. default
rules regarding implied warranties. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1994) (requiring that goods be fit
for their "ordinary purposes" to satisfy the implied warranty of merchantability); id. § 2315 (1994) (requiring that goods be fit for the buyer's "particular purpose" to satisfy the
implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose).
7. See, eg., Continental Bank, N.A. v. Everett, 964 F.2d 701, 705 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1035 (1992); Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d
873,876-77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 978 (1989); Beacham v. Macmillan, Inc., 837 F.
Supp. 970, 975 (S.D. Ind. 1993); Zeno Buick-GMC, Inc. v. GMC Truck & Coach, 844 F.
Supp. 1340, 1349 (E.D. Ark. 1992); LLMD, Inc. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp.,
789 F. Supp. 657, 660 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Rodie v. Max Factor & Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (Ct.
App. 1989); Dave Greytak Enters. v. Mazda Motors, Inc., 622 A.2d 14, 22-23 (Del. Ch.
1992); Indian Harbor Citrus, Inc. v. Poppell, 658 So. 2d 605, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Bowen v. Heth, 816 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); Castle v. McKnight, 866 P.2d
323, 326 (N.M. 1992).
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nated. 8 When, however, terms of the contract, whether express or derived from extrinsic sources such as usage of trade 9 and admissible
8. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Marino, 63 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that application of the covenant of good faith is limited to instances in which a party is
given discretion in enforcing certain provisions of the contract); Occusafe, Inc. v. EG&G
Rocky Flats, Inc., 54 F.3d 618, 624 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that a court's inquiry focuses
on whether the defendant's conduct violated the contracting parties' justified expectations); Travelers Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 41 F.3d 1570, 1575 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding "even when a contract confers decision-making power on a single party, the resulting
discretion is nevertheless subject to an obligation that it be exercised in good faith"); Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d 1356, 1361
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding that when one party retains a right of approval over the other
party to a contract, "such powers must be exercised within the parameters of the duty of
good faith"); Southwest Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Sunamp Sys., Inc., 838 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1992) (holding that "a contract thus would be breached by a failure to perform in
good faith if a party uses its discretion for a reason outside the contemplated range" of the
parties); Carma Developers (Cal.) Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d 710, 726-27
(Cal. 1992) (holding that the covenant requires the party holding discretionary power to
exercise it "for any purpose within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time
of formation-to capture opportunities that were preserved upon formation of the contract"); Neiditz v. Housing Auth., 654 A.2d 812, 819 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994), aftd, 651
A.2d 1295, 1296 (Conn. 1995) (holding that the covenant of good faith presupposes that
the terms of the contract are agreed upon and what is in dispute is the party's discretionary
application); Chemical Bank v. Paul, 614 N.E.2d 436, 442 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that
parties with unfettered discretion cannot be allowed to exercise that discretion in bad
faith); Julian v. Christopher, 575 A.2d 735. 739 (Md. 1990) (holding that if a lease does not
spell out any standard for exercising discretion then the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing should imply a reasonableness standard); Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC
Assocs., 583 N.E.2d 806, 820-21 (Mass. 1991) (holding that the use of a discretionary right
under the contract as a pretext to "sweeten the deal" is a breach of the covenant of fair
dealing and good faith); Weldon v. Montana Bank, 885 P.2d 511, 515 (Mont. 1994) (holding
that "when the discretion conferred by the contract has been misused to deprive the other
party of the benefit of the bargain" then there is a breach of the covenant of good faith);
Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 193 (N.H. 1989) (holding that the exercise of discretion by one contracting party must be limited in so far as it is in accord with
the parties' purpose in contracting); Uptown Heights Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Seafirst
Corp., 891 P.2d 639, 644 (Or. 1995) (holding that parties normally contemplate discretion
will be exercised for particular purposes; if the discretion is exercised outside these purposes then the party exercising the discretion has performed in bad faith); Olympus Hills
Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah Ct. App.
1995); see also Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform
in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 379-84 (1980) (stressing the importance of the covenant of good faith when a party engages in conduct allegedly pursuant to a grant of discretion). But cf Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that
when the contract expressly gives one party "sole discretion," the implied duty of good
faith cannot be used to renegotiate the terms of the contract).
9. Usage of trade may resolve the permissibility of conduct either by explaining an
ambiguous contractual reference to such conduct or by adding a supplemental term. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 222(3) (1979); U.C.C. § 2-202(a) (1994); see

also, e.g., Precision Steel Warehouse, Inc. v. Anderson-Martin Mach. Co., 854 S.W.2d 321,
325 (Ark. 1993) (trade usage explaining ambiguous term); Varni Bros. v. Wine World, Inc.,
41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 745-46 (Ct. App. 1995) (trade usage adding term permitting termina-
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parol evidence, 10 determine the permissibility of the conduct, no gap
filler is needed" and the covenant does not apply.
For example, assume a franchisee was granted a license to own
and operate a franchisor's restaurant. Thereafter, the franchisor
opened a new restaurant nearby, which undermined the profitability
of the franchisee's operation.' 2 If the contract were silent regarding
the permissibility of opening that restaurant, or if the contract gave
the franchisor discretion without designated limits to open new restaurants, the propriety of such conduct would be resolved under the covenant. If, however, the contract expressly granted the franchisor
unlimited discretion to open new restaurants, regardless of their proximity to the franchisee's restaurant, then the covenant could not be
utilized to override those terms.
tion only for good cause); Hayter Trucking, Inc. v. Shell W. E&P, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229,
241 (Ct. App. 1993) (explaining ambiguous term); C-Thru Container Corp. v. Midland
Mfg. Co., 533 N.W.2d 542, 544-45 (Iowa 1995) (trade usage adding a term that seller must
supply buyer with product sample to prove seller's capacity to produce product). A usage
of trade is defined as "a usage having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or
trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to a particular agreement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(1) (1979).
In addition to usage of trade, a prior course of dealing between the parties may be
used to explain or supplement the parties' agreement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223 (1979); U.C.C. § 2-202(a) (1994). It is also provided under U.C.C. § 202(a)
that the course of performance between the parties in the transaction at issue may be used
to explain or supplement the parties' agreement.
10. One source for determining the permissibility of conduct is an agreement regarding that conduct made by the parties prior to their contract. Such a prior agreement would
only be admissible if it was consistent with the parol evidence rule. Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts version of the parol evidence rule, the admissibility of such an
agreement depends on whether the parties' contract was "integrated." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 213(1)-(2) (1979). The U.C.C. parol evidence rule does not

use the term "integrated" but resolves the admissibility of prior agreements depending on
whether the parties intended their written contract as "final" or "complete and exclusive."
U.C.C. § 2-202 (1994).
11. See cases cited supra note 5. This limitation on the application of the covenant is
consistent with the general contract principle that in interpreting a contract, "an implication ... should not be made when the contrary is indicated in clear and express words." 3
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 64, at 298 (1960).
12. The example in the text is based on the facts of Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 756
F.Supp. 543, 545 (S.D. Fla. 1991). In that case the court held that the franchisor's decision
to open a new store in competition with one of its franchisees was subject to the covenant
of good faith. Id. at 549. Other courts have disagreed with this aspect of the Scheck court's
holding. See, e.g., Patel v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 1159, 1161 (Il1.App. Ct. 1986);
Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. D-Mart Food Stores, Inc., 431 N.W.2d 721, 723 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988). Those courts held that because defendant had, by the terms of the contract, been
given sole discretion to determine whether and where to open new stores, his discretion
was absolute and, therefore, not subject to the covenant of good faith. See infra notes 19193 and accompanying text for a discussion as to when a grant of discretion should be construed to be absolute.
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Il. Current Approaches
Although there is agreement that the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing applies when the permissibility of conduct otherwise is
unclear, 13 authorities differ about the methodology for determining
whether conduct violates the covenant. 14 Several approaches have
been proposed by commentators and adopted by the courts. An evaluation of these approaches shows that they fail to provide workable
guidelines for resolving good faith cases, compelling ad hoc decision
making.
A.

The Excluder Approach

One approach, introduced by Professor Summers15 and adopted
by many courts, 16 attempts to identify conduct that is excluded 17 from
the realm of good faith. This approach assumes that it is impossible to
formulate standards 18 or even relevant criteria' 9 for determining when
conduct is to be so excluded. Instead, the approach offers descriptive
categories and anecdotal examples of excludable conduct. These bad
faith categories include evasion of the spirit of the bargain,20 lack of
diligence and slacking off,2 1 willfully rendering only substantial performance,22 abuse of a power to determine compliance,2 3 and interfer24
ence with or failure to cooperate in the other party's performance.
However, there is no standard for determining when conduct falls into
any of these categories. For instance, describing bad faith conduct as
13. See cases cited supra notes 5-6.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 15-67.
15. Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).
16. See, e.g., Occusafe, Inc. v. EG&G Rocky Flats, Inc., 54 F.3d 618, 624 (10th Cir.
1995); Bank of China v. Chan, 937 F.2d 780, 789 (2d Cir. 1991); Kedra v. Nazareth Hosp.,
868 F. Supp. 733, 737 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 769 F.
Supp. 599, 652 (D. Del. 1991); Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 581 F. Supp. 955, 960 n.5 (N.D.
Ga. 1984); Larson v. Larson, 636 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994); Bourgeous v.
Horizon Healthcare Corp., 872 P.2d 852, 856 (N.M. 1994); Somers v. Somers, 613 A.2d
1211, 1213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Garrett v. Bankwest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833, 845 (S.D.
1990); Carmichael v. Adirondack Bottled Gas Corp., 635 A.2d 1211, 1216-17 (Vt. 1993).
17. Professor Summers contends that good faith "is best understood as an 'excluder'-it is a phrase which has no general meaning or meanings of its own, but which
serves to exclude many heterogeneous forms of bad faith." Summers, supra note 15, at
196.
18. Id. at 215 (stating that "[i]f an obligation of good faith is to do its job, it must be
open-ended rather than sealed off in a definition").
19. Id. at 206 (arguing that "criteria must vary from context to context").
20. Id. at 234-35.
21. Id. at 235-37.
22. Id. at 237-38.
23. Id. at 240-41.
24. Id. at 241-43.
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an evasion of the spirit of the bargain, even with an anecdotal example,25 offers little guidance on how to determine the spirit of the bargain or how to evaluate when it is being evaded.
This approach compels courts to resolve cases on an intuitive ad
hoc basis, without guidelines,2 6 except in those rare cases in which patterns of conduct have become generally recognized as violating the
covenant. 27 Such an ad hoc approach is deficient because it promotes
capricious and unpredictable decision making28 while increasing trans25. Professor Summers offers this example of evasion of the spirit of the bargain:
Suppose a seller develops and builds a market for product X and then sells his
rights to manufacture and market it; the buyer of these rights is to pay royalties
according to a rate based on the sales he makes. Later, the buyer develops product Y, which competes with X. Can the buyer keep X under his control until the
market for Y has been built up and then safely forget X? The answer is "no," for
the buyer would be evading the spirit of the deal and therefore would be acting in
bad faith.
Id at 235.
26. Professor Summers acknowledges the ad hoc nature of his excluder approach.
If an obligation of good faith is to do its job, it must be open-ended rather than
sealed off in a definition. Courts should be left free, under the aegis of a statutory
green light, to deal with any and all significant forms of contractual bad faith,
familiar and unfamiliar.
Id at 215; see also James H. Cook, Comment, Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v.
Standard Oil Co.: Tortious Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing in a
NoninsuranceCommercial ContractCase, 71 IowA L. REv. 893, 899-900 (1986) (criticizing
Professor Summers' excluder approach on the ground that it requires ad hoc decisions
without guidelines).
27. Two types of conduct are most widely recognized as violating the covenant. The
first occurs when defendant intentionally prevents plaintiff from performing her contractual duties or satisfying contractual conditions. See, eg., Monotype Corp. v. International
Tyapeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443,451 (9th Cir. 1994); Crossland v. Canteen Corp., 711 F.2d 714,
728 (5th Cir. 1983); Sharma v. Skaarup Ship Management Corp., 699 F. Supp. 440, 449
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 916 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 907 (1991); Bonanza Int'l, Inc. v. Restaurant Management Consultants, 625 F. Supp. 1431, 1445 (E.D. La.
1986); Knudsen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 450 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Minn. 1990). This conduct would fall within Professor Summers's broad category of interference with or failing
to cooperate in the other party's performance. See Summers, supra note 15, at 241-43, and
accompanying text. The second type of conduct occurs when defendant's duty to perform
is dependent on his personal satisfaction and he misrepresents his dissatisfaction. See, e.g.,
Greenwood v. Koven, 880 F. Supp. 186, 199-200 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Mike Naughton Ford,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 862 F. Supp. 264, 269 (D. Colo. 1994); International Minerals &
Mining Corp. v. Citicorp N. Am., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 587, 595 n.7 (D.N.J. 1990); Jones v.
Hollingsworth, 560 P.2d 348, 351-52 (Wash. 1977). This conduct would fall within Professor Summers's broad category of abuse of a power to determine compliance. See Summers, supra note 15, at 235, and accompanying text.
28. The need for predictable results is magnified by the litigiousness of society.
We are a litigious people, but our litigiousness need not produce a mass of vague
rules capriciously applied to produce unpredictable results. Our litigiousness argues instead for clear rules consistently applied to produce predictable results.
This would discourage frivolous litigation, encourage prompt settlement of well-
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action costs. 29 Without a definitive rule, courts can impose unexpected burdens on either party. Plaintiff cannot determine when
defendant may permissibly undermine her contractual interests. Defendant cannot determine when he will be prohibited from promoting
his own contractual interests. Without the ability to make those determinations, the parties cannot assess contractual risks 30 and may find
themselves with unexpected
contractual obligations to which they
31
would not have agreed.
An ad hoc system also increases the likelihood of breach and fosters litigation. It increases the likelihood of breach because, without
guidance about the limits of acceptable conduct, defendant will not
know how to avoid breach. 32 It fosters litigation because the parties
founded litigation, and facilitate the just resolutions of those few lawsuits that did
not settle.
John H. Robinson & Mary E. Huber, The Law of Higher Education and the Courts: 1993
In Review, 21 J.C. & U.L. 157, 303 (1994); see also John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell,
Some Effects of Uncertainty on C6mpliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 968
(1984) (stating that when parties cannot determine the legal consequences of possible
courses of action because of vague or unpredictable rules, they will tend to overcomply or
undercomply); Lillard, supra note 3, at 1236 (recognizing criticism that covenant is vague
and subject to uneven results); Blake D. Morant, Contracts Limiting Liability: A Paradox
with Tacit Solutions, 69 TUL. L. REV. 715, 727-28 (1995) (stating that vague standards lead
to inconsistent results, uncertainty, and insecurity among bargainers in the marketplace).
29. Rules that are uncertain in result increase transaction costs because parties must
expend time and resources to bargain around them. "The imposition of a default term
whose effect is uncertain will not reduce transaction costs. On the contrary, it will increase
them: parties will attempt to exclude by contract the added uncertainty of unpredictable
judicial intervention." Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration,and the Windfall Principle of
ContractRemedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 47 (1991); see also Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REV. 389, 395
(1993) (stating that "the policies of both contract and property law include creating certainty and predictability to reduce the parties' planning and transaction costs").
30. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 4 (1979) (stating that a contract can be viewed as an agreed upon allocation of
risks); Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in ContractDamages, 1992 Wis. L.
REV. 1755, 1772 (1992) (stating that "[c]ontract law revolves around agreements among
parties allocating the risks of a business transaction").
31. See Kull, supra note 29, at 47. Even courts that justify the vagueness of the covenant as an unavoidable necessity concede that "if contracting parties cannot profitably use
their contractual powers without fear that a jury will second guess them under a vague
standard of good faith, the law will impair the predictability that an orderly commerce
requires." Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Shopping Ctrs., Inc.,
889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Southwest Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Sunamp
Sys., Inc., 838 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)).
32. Patrick J. Kelley, Holmes's Early ConstitutionalLaw Theory and its Application in
Takings Cases on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 357, 365
(1994) ("Legal rules that are fixed, definite, and certain will be more effective than rules
that are vague, indefinite and uncertain because people can better predict the legal consequences of fixed, definite, and certain rules and thus can better conform their conduct to
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cannot determine the legal consequences of conduct and may be
forced to seek judicial resolution of resulting disputes. 33
B. The Foregone Opportunity Approach

Another approach, introduced by Professor Burton, 34 contends
that the covenant is violated when a party attempts to recapture a
foregone opportunity. 35 A foregone opportunity is one that defendant bargained away as the price for entering into the contract. 36
Whether that opportunity has been foregone depends on the reasonable expectations of the parties. 37 Only if the parties reasonably ex-

pected that defendant would not attempt to reap the benefits
sought
by his conduct will an opportunity be deemed foregone. 38
The difficulty with this approach is that the determination
whether particular conduct represents such a foregone opportunity is
frequently beyond the court's ability to ascertain 39 for the very reason
the rule") (citing OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 88-90 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed. 1963)).
33. See Kull, supra note 29, at 47 (stating that "the uncertainty of outcome under any
such [unpredictable] legal rule will encourage litigation"); see also Robinson & Huber,
supra note 28, at 303 (stating that vague rules promote litigation); Mark Snyderman,
What's So Good About Good Faith? The Good Faith PerformanceObligation in Commer-

cial Lending, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335, 1361 (1988) (stating that "[an] unrequited cost of
court interference is the wasteful litigation produced when courts demonstrate their willingness to rewrite contracts and create vague and inconsistent rules"); Joseph F. Weis Jr.,
Are Courts Obsolete?, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1385, 1396 (1992) (stating that "[t]he ability of lawyers to advise their clients with some degree of certainty is critical in avoiding
disputes").
34. Burton, supra note 8, at 387-92.
35. Id. at 387.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 390-91.
38. For cases adopting this approach, see Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors
Corp., 873 F.2d 873, 876 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 978 (1989); Richard Short Oil Co.
v. Texaco, Inc., 789 F.2d 415, 422 (8th Cir. 1986); James v. Whirlpool Corp., 806 F. Supp.
835, 843 (E.D. Mo. 1992); Three D Dep'ts, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 670 F. Supp. 1404, 1408
n.4 (N.D. II. 1987); Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc. 826 P.2d
710,727 (Cal. 1992); Warner v. Konover, 553 A.2d 1138, 1141 (Conn. 1989); Anthony's Pier
Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 583 N.E.2d 806, 820-21 (Mass. 1991); Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 194 (N.H. 1989); cf.United States Nat'l Bank v. Boge, 814 P.2d
1082, 1091 (Or. 1991).
39. When defendant's conduct promotes his own interests while undermining plaintiff's, it will not be difficult for both sides to submit viable reasonable expectation arguments. In the restaurant franchise case, for example, defendant can plausibly assert that
because the contract did not forbid or otherwise limit his ability to open new restaurants,
his decision to do so in order to increase his profits was consistent with his reasonable
expectations, irrespective of the fact that it resulted in a diminution of plaintiff's profits.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, can argue that because the contract did not expressly confer
upon defendant the ability to open new restaurants near plaintiff's, his decision to do so
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that the conduct is not referred to in the contract. 4 0 When the contract does not indicate the permissibility of conduct, there is no
agreed-upon source for determining whether the parties reasonably
expected that the conduct would constitute a foregone opportunity.
Without guidelines, courts are forced to apply this approach
on an
41
intuitive basis with all the pitfalls of an ad hoc system.
C. The Reasonable Expectations Approach
Many courts have adopted half of Professor Burton's approach
by focusing on the question whether the conduct was beyond the reasonable expectations of the parties, while ignoring the issue of foregone opportunities. 42 Without a standard for determining when one

party's expectations are reasonable, this approach suffers
from the
same deficiencies as the foregone opportunity approach. 43

was inconsistent with her reasonable expectation that defendant would take no action to
reduce the profitability of her franchise.
40. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.16, at 546-47 (2d ed. 1990).
41. Professor Burton acknowledges the deficiencies of a pure reasonable expectations
test to determine when conduct violates the covenant because those unfocused expectations "direct attention to the amorphous totality of the factual circumstances at the time of
formation [of the contract], and fail to distinguish relevant from irrelevant facts within that
realm." Burton, supra note 8, at 371-72. By directing attention to the specific issue of
whether opportunities were foregone, Burton believed analysis would be advanced. Id. at
391. The problem, however, is that even knowing the relevant circumstances existing at
the formation of the contract does not lead to a resolution of whether particular conduct is
consistent with the parties' reasonable expectations.
The truth is that a party frequently contracts with the expectation that the other will
be permitted to exploit his own self-interest to the extent that the contract does not expressly preclude such opportunistic behavior. See Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 540,
560 (1990). Frequently she expects that the other will forego his self-interest and engage in
cooperative behavior. Id. Whether a particular party expected one over the other and to
what extent she expected it frequently cannot be fathomed from the circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract. Id. "The transactional signals parties send are too
ambiguous to permit uniform interpretation." Id. at 581. Despite its theoretical appeal,
Burton's test ultimately demands resolution by intuition or individualized value judgments.
42. See, e.g., Tidmore Oil Co. v. BP Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1384, 1391 (11th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 925 (1991); Big Horn Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d
1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988); Zeno Buick-GMC, Inc. v. GMC Truck & Coach, 844 F. Supp.
1340, 1349 (E.D. Ark. 1992); Seal v. Riverside Fed. Sav. Bank, 825 F. Supp. 686, 689 (E.D.
Pa. 1993); Flight Concepts Ltd. Partnership v. Boeing Co., 819 F. Supp. 1535, 1550 (D. Kan.
1993); James v. Whirlpool Corp., 806 F. Supp. 835, 843 (E.D. Mo. 1992); Eis v. Meyer, 566
A.2d 422, 426 (Conn. 1989); Schaal v. Flathead Valley Community College, 901 P.2d 541,
544 (Mont. 1995).
43. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, § 7.16, at 546-47.
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D. The Justice Approach

It has been proposed that the question whether the covenant has
been violated should be determined by judicial concepts of justice
rather than by the parties' expectations. 44 This approach, however,
also suffers from the same vagueness as the previously discussed approaches. It does not state the criteria for determining what constitutes justice, 45 leaving courts with little besides their intuition to
resolve good faith cases. Without articulated standards, a rule based
solely on justice is an invitation to inconsistency. When competing
interests are balanced, one party's notion of justice may be the other
party's notion of injustice.
E. The Purpose Approach

Some courts find conduct in violation of the covenant if it is in46
consistent with the parties' purpose for entering into the contract.
This approach uses the same analysis applied to determine whether
conduct violates an ambiguous statute. Courts will construe a statute
to prohibit particular conduct if that prohibition is consistent with the
legislature's purpose in enacting the statute. 47 Unfortunately, this leg44. See id. § 7.16, at 547-48; see also Koehrer v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820,
828 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that "the obligations stemming from the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing are imposed by law as normative values of society"); Lowe v.
Feldman, 168 N.Y.S.2d 674, 680 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (holding that a court will, "where justice
and expediency demand, infuse the contract with the spirit of good faith and fair dealing").
But see Don King Prods. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 741, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (distinguishing
between legal duties and ethical duties in the context of the covenant of good faith and
indicating that only legal duties are enforceable).
45. See sources cited supra note 44. Furthermore, it is unclear whether "justice"
should be determined from the societal perspective of notions of fairness and morality,
from the parties' perspective based on their reasons for entering into the contract, or from
the trade perspective of business ethics.
46. See, e.g., Market St. Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir.
1991); M/A-Corn Sec. Corp. v. Galesi, 904 F.2d 134, 136 (2d Cir. 1990); Ford v. Manufacturers Hanover Mortgage Corp., 831 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1987); Burger King Corp. v.
Weaver, 798 F. Supp. 684, 688 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Ellis v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 246 Cal.
Rptr. 863, 866 (Ct. App. 1988); Bonanza, Inc. v. McLean, 747 P.2d 792, 800-01 (Kan. 1987);
Continental Potash, Inc. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 858 P.2d 66, 80 (N.M. 1993); Bicycle
Transit Auth., Inc. v. Bell, 333 S.E.2d 299, 305 (N.C. 1985).
47. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113
S. Ct. 2264, 2281-82 (1993) (reasoning that "we turn, as we would in the usual case of
textual ambiguity, to the legislative purpose as revealed by the history of the statute, for
such light as it may shed"); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 517 (1982) (holding that "where
the statute's language seem[s] insufficiently precise, the 'natural way' to draw the line 'is in
light of the statutory purpose"' (quoting United States v. Bacto-Unidisck, 394 U.S. 784, 799
(1960))); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S.

L. REv. 845, 853 (1992) (stating that "[a] court often needs to know the purpose of a
particular statutory word or phrase ... in order to decide properly whether a particular
circumstance falls within the scope of that word or phrase").
CAL.
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islative approach is unworkable in a contractual context. Parties have

distinct and potentially conflicting purposes for entering into a contractual relationship. 48 As a consequence, one party may engage in
conduct that furthers his own contractual purpose but undermines the

other's. Frequently, in commercial contracts each party's purpose is
to maximize his profits, but those purposes are potentially conflicting.

For example, when the restaurant franchisor opens a new restaurant
in close proximity to an existing franchisee, that conduct will promote

the franchisor's purpose while simultaneously undermining the
franchisee's.
A fictional, nonexistent, unitary contractual purpose cannot determine whether conduct violates the covenant. From the perspective
of contractual purpose, a violation of the covenant should depend on
whether defendant's promotion of his contractual purpose unduly intrudes upon plaintiff's contractual purpose.49 The purpose approach
does not define when that point is reached.
F. The Restatement Approach

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has described the covenant of good faith in terms that combine elements of each of the foregoing approaches:
Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the
justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of
types of conduct characterized as involving "bad faith" because they
violate community standards of decency, fairness or
reasonableness.5 0
48. See Douglas G. Baird, Self-Interest and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts,19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 583, 583-84 (1990).

49. See cases cited supra note 46. Some courts have combined the reasonable expectations approach and the purpose approach by stating that conduct violates the covenant of
good faith when it violates an agreed common purpose or is inconsistent with the parties'
reasonable expectations. See, e.g., Occusafe, Inc. v. EG&G Rocky Flats, Inc., 54 F.3d 618,
624 (10th Cir. 1995); Maljack Prods., Inc. v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 52 F.3d 373, 375 (D.C.
Cir. 1995); Cross & Cross Properties, Ltd. v. Everett Allied Co., 886 F.2d 497, 502 (2d Cir.
1989); Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 798 F. Supp. 692, 694 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Blue Jeans
Equities West v. City & County of San Francisco, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 119 (Ct. App. 1992);
Wells Fargo Realty Advisors Funding, Inc. v. Uioli, Inc., 872 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1994); Perry v. Jordan, 900 P.2d 335, 338 (Nev. 1995); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Kissee, 859 P.2d 502, 509 (Okla. 1993); Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food
& Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445,451 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Capital Impact Corp. v. Munro,
642 A.2d 1175, 1177 (Vt. 1994). This compound approach offers no greater clarity than
either approach offers separately.
50.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979).
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The above language from the Restatement, to which numerous
courts have referred, 51 specifically adopts the purpose, reasonable expectations, and excluder 52 approaches. It does not expressly incorporate the justice approach, but it necessitates the same ad hoc value
judgments by evaluating good faith based on undefined community
standards of decency, fairness, or reasonableness. The Restatement
does not indicate which of its component approaches is paramount if
they conflict. More importantly, though this combined approach may
create the illusion of guidance, the linking of several ad hoc approaches does not overcome their individual deficiencies.
G. The Fruits of the Contract Approach
A common aphorism asserts that conduct which would destroy or
injure the other party's right to receive the fruits53 or benefits54 of the
51. See, e.g., Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 873, 876 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied,493 U.S. 978 (1989); Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Home Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 721 F.Supp. 940, 945 (W.D. Tenn. 1989); Careau & Co. v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 272 Cal. Rptr. 387, 398 (Ct. App. 1990); Warner v. Konover, 553 A.2d
1138, 1141 (Conn. 1989); Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 849 (Kan. 1987); Cenac v.
Murry, 609 So. 2d 1257, 1272 (Miss. 1992); Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d
187, 191 (N.H. 1989); United States Nat'l Bank v. Boge, 814 P.2d 1082, 1091 (Or. 1991);
Carmichael v. Adirondack Bottled Gas Corp., 635 A.2d 1211, 1216-17 (Vt. 1993); Wilder v.
Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 220 (Wyo. 1994).
52. The comments to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 use examples of bad
faith conduct drawn, nearly verbatim, from Professor Summers's 1968 article introducing
the excluder approach. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 205 cmts. d-e
with Summers, supra note 15, at 216-17. Comment d provides, in agreement with Professor
Summers' thesis, that "[a] complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible." See
Summers, supra note 15, at 206.
Professor Summers reports that his 1968 article led to the drafting of § 205:
The late Robert Braucher, then Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, was the
Reporter for the Restatement Second during the years when section 205 was in
embryo, and he drafted it. Professor Braucher acknowledged that an article I
wrote on the subject published in 1968 substantially influenced the recognition
and conceptualization of good faith in section 205.
Robert S. Summers, The GeneralDuty of Good Faith-ItsRecognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 810 (1982).

53. For cases that phrase the aphorism in terms of a party's right to receive the "fruits
of the contract," see Chambers Dev. Co. v. Passaic County Utils. Auth., 62 F.3d 582, 587
(3rd Cir. 1995) (quoting Bak-A-Lum of America v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., Inc., 351 A.2d 349,
352 (N.J. 1976)); Public Serv. Co. v. Burlington N.R.R., 53 F.3d 1090, 1097 (10th Cir. 1995);
M/A-Com Sec. Corp. v. Galesi, 904 F.2d 134, 136 (2d Cir. 1990); Local 3-7, Int'l Woodworkers v. Daw Forest Prods. Co., 833 F.2d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1987); Oregon RSA No. 6,
Inc. v. Castle Rock Cellular, 840 F. Supp. 770, 776 (D. Or. 1993); Shannon .v. Keystone
Info. Sys., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 341, 344-45 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Ripplemeyer v. National Grape
Coop. Ass'n, 807 F. Supp. 1439, 1451 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (quoting Gallagher v. Lambert, 549
N.E.2d 136, 141 (N.Y. 1989)); Bank of New York v. Sasson, 786 F. Supp. 349, 353
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Kirk La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87
(1933)); Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 844 (Cal. 1985); Blank v. Chelmsford
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contract violates the covenant. This standard is overbroad to the ex-

tent it suggests that defendant can do nothing that would lessen plaintiff's anticipated contract benefits. For example, in a requirements
contract a buyer's reduced requirements would not constitute a violation of the covenant merely because it reduced the seller's anticipated
profitsi 5 Nor would a court necessarily hold that the restaurant
franchisor who opened a new restaurant violated the covenant merely
because his new restaurant reduced the profits of the franchisee. This
aphorism ignores that occasions will arise when defendant is entitled
to injure plaintiff's contractual interests to promote his own. Defend-

ant's conduct must unduly injure plaintiff's contractual interests to violate the covenant. However, courts have56been unwilling or unable to
set criteria for determining undue injury.
H.

The U.C.C. Approach

According to the Uniform Commercial Code, good faith always
57
requires honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.

The U.C.C. neither defines the meaning of the term "honesty in fact,"
nor describes prohibited conduct, 58 nor indicates whether the term
OB/GYN, P.C., 649 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Mass. 1995) (quoting Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v.
HBC Assocs., 583 N.E.2d 806, 820 (Mass. 1991)).
54. For cases that phrase the aphorism in terms of a party's right to receive the "benefits of the contract," see Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 175 B.R. 438, 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 900 P.2d 619, 639 (Cal. 1995); Cimino v.
FirsTier Bank, N.A., 530 N.W.2d 606, 616 (Neb. 1995); High Plains Genetics Research, Inc.
v. J K Mill-Iron Ranch, 535 N.W.2d 839, 843 (S.D. 1995).
55. The Official Comments to the U.C.C. provision governing requirements contracts
state:
Reasonable elasticity in the requirements is expressly envisaged by this section
and good faith variations from prior requirements are permitted even when the
variation may be such as to result in discontinuance. A shutdown by a requirements buyer for lack of orders might be permissible when a shutdown merely to
curtail losses would not. The essential test is whether the party is acting in good
faith.
U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. 2 (1994).
56. See cases cited supra notes 53-54.
57. The U.C.C. imposes a duty of good faith on all parties. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994); see
supra note 1. Good faith is defined to mean "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1994). The honesty in fact requirement of § 1-201(19) is
a baseline requirement for good faith throughout the Code. According to the Official
Comment to U.C.C. § 1-201, "Good faith, whenever it is used in the Code, means at least
what is here stated." U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 19 (1994). Although special definitions of good
faith can be found in the Code, those definitions all include the element of "honesty in
fact." See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1)(b), 3-103(a)(4) (1994).
58. The Official Comment to U.C.C. § 1-201(19) offers no elaboration on the meaning
of "honesty in fact" or the kinds of conduct that would be prohibited by defining good faith
in this way. U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 19 (1994). The Official Comments to the special defini-
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should be given a broad5 9 or narrow6 0 meaning. Judicial interpreta-

tions state that the phrase requires defendant to demonstrate a "white
heart" even if his conduct reflects an "empty head."'61 The "white
heart, empty head" terminology is amorphous, providing no meaningful guideline for identifying dishonest conduct.
In limited circumstances, in addition to honesty, the U.C.C. requires "observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing
in the trade." 62 The U.C.C. does not define the term "reasonable

commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade". 63 If it means that
each trade defines fair dealing, this aspect of the U.C.C. is of minimal
significance because in most trades there are no generally accepted
and well-defined standards of fair dealing.64 If the term means that
tions of good faith are also silent on the meaning to be ascribed to "honesty in fact." See,
eg., U.C.C. § 2-103 cmts. (1994); id. § 3-103 cmt. 4 (1994).

59. "In its broader meaning, 'dishonesty' is defined as a breach of trust, a 'lack
of ... probity or integrity in principle,' 'lack of fairness,' or 'a disposition to betray."'
United States v. Brackeen, 969 F.2d 827,829 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 650 (unabridged ed. 1986)).
60. "In its narrower meaning, however,,'dishonesty' is defined as deceitful behavior, a
'disposition to defraud [or] deceive,' . . . or a '[d]isposition to lie, cheat, or defraud."' Id.
(citing BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 421 (5th ed. 1979)).
61. "Some term it the 'white heart, empty head' test. It is not sufficient that there be
circumstances or suspicions such as would put a careful purchaser on inquiry. We have
traditionally held that subjective good faith is simply 'the honest belief that [your] conduct
is rightful."' Schluter v. United Farmers Elevator, 479 N.W.2d 82, 85 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (quoting Wohlrabe v. Pownell, 307 N.W.2d 478, 483 (Minn. 1981)); cf. Utility Contractors Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Amsouth Bank N.A. (In re Joe Morgan, Inc.), 985 F.2d 1554,
1560-61 (11th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that Alabama applies both subjective and objective
analyses of good faith under the U.C.C.); Shearson Lehman Bros. v. Wasatch Bank, 788 F.
Supp. 1184, 1194 (D. Utah 1992); Brill v. Catfish Shaks of America, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 1035,
1040-41 (E.D. La. 1989); Kline v. Central Motors Dodge, Inc., 614 A.2d 1313, 1316 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
62. In Article 2 (Sales), "'good faith' in the case of a merchant is honesty in fact and
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C.
§ 2-103(l)(b) (1994). This definition of good faith is also used in Article 2A (Leases).
U.C.C. § 2A-103(3) (1994).
In Article 3 (Negotiable Instruments), good faith is defined to mean "honesty in fact
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 3103(a)(4) (1994). This definition is also used in Article 4 (Bank Collections). U.C.C. § 4104(c) (1994).
63. The U.C.C. fails to define what would constitute observance of reasonable commercial standards, other than to distinguish it from due care.
Although fair dealing is a broad term that must be defined in context, it is clear
that it is concerned with the fairness of conduct rather than the care with which an
act is performed. Failure to exercise ordinary care in conducting a transaction is
an entirely different concept than failure to deal fairly in conducting the
transaction.
U.C.C. § 3-103 cmt. 4 (1994).
64. There are remarkably few decisions in which courts have made an effort to ascertain a given trade's standards of fair dealing. See e.g., Morgold, Inc. v. Keeler, 891 F. Supp.
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standards outside the trade are applicable, 65 it gives no guidelines to
which standards to apply. Courts frequently cite the U.C.C. language
regarding reasonable standards of fair dealing, without explaining the

meaning of that language, and then announce a conclusion about

whether the conduct at issue is prohibited. 66 Some courts cite this
term and then select from among the above described approaches to
resolve the issue, 67 thereby incorporating the deficiencies of whatever
approach is selected.

Il.

The Proposed Standards

The authors disagree with Professor Summers' conclusion that
neither standards 68 nor criteria 69 can be devised for resolving when
conduct violates the covenant of good faith. We submit that a framework of standards can be created that would substantially reduce ad
hoc decision making in covenant cases.
We propose a series of standards defining when conduct will violate the covenant of good faith. These standards are divided into two
categories. One category covers violations of the covenant involving
commercial unreasonableness, 70 and the other covers violations in1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that a dealer in art must take reasonable steps to
inquire into the title to a painting).
65. A standard of fair dealing derived from outside the trade would be likely under
the definitions of good faith provided in U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(4) and 4-104(c) because those
definitions do not refer to standards of fair dealing "in the trade." See supra note 62.
66. See, e.g., Rayle Tech, Inc. v. DeKalb Swine Breeders, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1472, 1477
(S.D. Ga. 1995); Sonfast Corp. v. York Int'l Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1099, 1105-06 (M.D. Pa.
1995); Brookside Farms v. Mama Rizzo's, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 1029, 1034-35 (S.D. Tex. 1995);
Potomac Plaza Terraces, Inc. v. QSC Prods., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 346, 351-52 (D.D.C. 1994);
Kansas Mun. Gas Agency v. Vesta Energy Co., 840 F. Supp. 814, 820 (D. Kan. 1993); PSI
Energy, Inc. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1430, 1439 (S.D. Ind. 1993); Hodges
Wholesale Cars v. Auto Dealer's Exch., 628 So. 2d 608, 611 (Ala. 1993); Barn-Chestnut,
Inc. v. CFM Dev. Corp., 457 S.E.2d 502, 508-09 (W. Va. 1995).
67. See, e.g., R.W. Power Partners, L.P. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 899 F. Supp.
1490, 1498 (E.D. Va. 1995) (applying the fruits of the contract approach); Aylett v. Universal Frozen Foods Co., 861 P.2d 375, 377-78 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (applying the reasonable
expectations of the parties approach); see also Steven J. Burton, Good Faith in Articles 1
and 2 of the U.C.C.: The Practice View, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1533, 1535 (1994) (criticizing the "judicial propensity to mix statutory and common law authorities in good faith
cases"). Some cases mix U.C.C. good faith terminology with the common law approaches,
but fail to address whether the applicable U.C.C. good faith entails commercial reasonableness or honesty in fact. See Bank of China v. Chan, 937 F.2d 780, 788-89 (2d Cir. 1991)
(mixing U.C.C., Restatement, and purpose approaches); Big Horn Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988) (mixing U.C.C. and reasonable
expectations approaches).
68. See Summers, supra note 15, at 215, and accompanying text.
69. See id. at 206 and accompanying text.
70. See infra subpart III.A.

March 1996]

COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH

volving dishonesty. 71 These two categories
will give content and defi72
nition to the U.C.C. terminology.
The proposed standards would not apply when the express terms
of the contract, admissible extrinsic sources such as trade custom or
parol evidence, or another default rule such as an implied warranty
determine the permissibility of conduct. 73 Nor would these standards
replace existing rules providing heightened obligations of good faith,
such as those involving fiduciaries 74 and insurance contracts. 75 Additionally, these standards would not supersede
the courts' ability to
76
prohibit conduct that violates public policy.
71. See infra subpart III.B.
72. The U.C.C. definitions of good faith distinguish between the requirement of honesty and the requirement of observing reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.
See supra note 62. Honesty is required by all U.C.C. definitions of good faith, whereas
commercial reasonableness is required by some but not all. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 2103(1)(b), 2A-103(3), § 3-103(a)(4), 4-104(c) (1994).
73. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
74. One who holds a fiduciary duty to another must act with the utmost degree of
good faith and loyalty in order to properly discharge that duty. That obligation of good
faith, however, stems not from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but
from the fiduciary relationship itself. See, e.g., Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206, 1215 (8th Cir. 1990); Johnson v. Pacific Lighting Land Co., 817
F.2d 601, 607 (9th Cir. 1987); CSFM Corp. v. Elbert & McKee Co., 870 F. Supp. 819, 830
(N.D. Il1.1994); Bay Shore Properties, Inc. v. Drew Corp., 565 So. 2d 32, 34 (Ala. 1990);
Barry v. Raskov, 283 Cal. Rptr. 463, 467 (Ct. App. 1991); Robert S. Adler & Richard A.
Mann, Good Faith:A New Look atan Old Problem, 28 AKRON L. REv. 31,34 (1994). But
see Wilf v. Halpern, 599 N.Y.S.2d 579, 580 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that a partner's refusal to consent to renegotiation of partnership debt for solely personal reasons was "in
contravention of the fundamental implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing governing the parties' fiduciary obligations to one another").
75. See e.g., Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) (the covenant
of good faith requires "at the very least, that the insurer will diligently investigate the facts
to enable it to determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, and will
thereafter act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim"); accord Weese v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 879 F.2d 115, 118 (4th Cir. 1989); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co.,
271 N.W.2d 368, 377 (Wis. 1978); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Wu, 552 A.2d 1196, 1199-2000
(Vt. 1988); see also Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 145 (Cal. 1979) (holding that the covenant requires that insurers "give at least as much consideration to the
welfare of its insured as it gives to its own interests"); accordJordan v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 843 F.Supp. 164, 171 (S.D. Miss. 1993); Brown v. Superior Court, 670 P.2d
725, 734 (Ariz. 1983). See generally Willy E. Rice, JudicialBias, The Insurance Industry
and Consumer Protection: An EmpiricalAnalysis of State Supreme Courts' Bad-Faith,
Breach-of-Contract, Breach-of-Covenant-Of-Good-Faith and Excess-Judgment Decisions,
1900-1991, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 325 (considering the judicial bias in imposing special good
faith burdens upon insurers); Eileen A. Scallen, PromisesBroken vs. Promises Betrayed.Metaphor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 897, 929-38
(suggesting that the obligations imposed upon insurers through the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing constitute an imposition of fiduciary obligations).
76. This distinction between violations of public policy and violations of the covenant
of good faith is consistent with the current state of the law. Conduct that violates public
policy is prohibited irrespective of and independent of the parties' contractual agreement.
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Commercial Unreasonableness

The proposed standards under this category impose limitations
on defendant's ability to injure plaintiff's contractual interests, irre-

spective of dishonesty. These standards impose a cooperative element
in the performance of contracts by obligating defendant to give due

consideration to plaintiff's interests when engaging in conduct that is
not otherwise prohibited.
(1)

Causing Material Injury

Defendant would violate the covenant when he had reason to
know that his conduct would cause plaintiff material contractual in-

jury unless the conduct was necessary to avoid material contractual
injury to himself.
(a)

Materiality
The analysis of materiality would be similar to that required to

77
determine whether a mistake is material for purposes of rescission
or whether a breach is material for purposes of excusing plaintiff's

performance. 78 Under those doctrines, the degree to which the ag-

See, e.g., Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that claims
based on conduct in violation of public policy exist "independent of any contractual
right"); Fleming v. Pima County, 685 P.2d 1301, 1306 (Ariz. 1984); Gonzales v. Prestress
Eng'g Corp., 503 N.E.2d 308, 313 (Ill. 1986); Phillips v. Butterball Farms Co., 532 N.W.2d
144, 147 (Mich. 1995) (holding that "the source of the right against retaliatory discharge
does not stem from any term agreed upon by the contracting parties, but from public policy"); Rampy v. ICI Acrylics, Inc., 898 S.W.2d 196, 209 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
77. Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts the materiality of a mistake is a
factor in determining whether the mistake constitutes grounds for rescission of the contract. For mutual mistakes, section 152 provides in part:
Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic
assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed
exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party
unless he bears the risk of the mistake ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (1979). For unilateral mistakes, section
153 provides in part:
Where a mistake of one party at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which he made the contract has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances that is adverse to him. the contract is voidable by him if
he does not bear the risk of the mistake ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1979).
78. According to the material breach rule of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
"it is a condition of each party's remaining duties to render performances to be exchanged
under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured material failure by the other party
to render any such performance due at an earlier time." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1979); see also id. § 164 (1979) (material misrepresentation inducing one

party's assent may make contract voidable);

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION

§ 9(2) (1937)

(innocent misrepresentation and non-disclosure are grounds for restitution only if material); id. § 28 (1937) (material misrepresentation is grounds for restitution).
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grieved party's essential contractual purpose was undermined is a fundamental factor.79 Under the proposed standard, material contractual
injury exists when conduct defeats a party's essential purpose for entering into the contract. In the restaurant franchise case, if the newly
opened restaurant were located in such close proximity to plaintiff's
franchise that her contractual purpose of maintaining a viable
franchise were defeated, the franchisor's conduct would cause a material contractual injury to plaintiff. If, however, the new restaurant
were sufficiently distant that its likely impact would be to reduce profitability but not eliminate the viability of plaintiff's franchise, the injury, while significant, would not be material.80
A contract is a cooperative venture by which the parties have
chosen to link their respective self-interests. 8 ' In order to generate
anticipated advantages for both, the parties have agreed to relinquish
79. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 573, at 586 (1991) (stating that a material breach is
"such a breach of a contract as substantially defeats its purpose"). It has been held that a
"material breach is one which touches the fundamental purposes of the contract and
defeats the object of the parties in making the contract." Rogers v. Relyea, 601 P.2d 37,41
(Mont. 1979); see also Ogle v. Wright, 360 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (holding
that material breach goes to the "heart of the contract"). According to the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, one factor to be considered in determining whether a party's breach
is material is "the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he
reasonably expected." RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CONTRAcrs § 241(a) (1979).

Often the issue of whether a party has materially breached is stated in terms of
whether that party has failed to substantially perform the contract. If a party has substantially performed, then he has not materially breached and therefore the injured party is not
excused from performance. FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, § 8.16, at 638. The accepted test
for substantial performance is whether performance meets the essential purpose of the
contract. By implication the test for material breach is whether performance defeats that
purpose. See, e.g., Stein v. William C. Cox, Inc., 57 B.R. 1016, 1021-22 (E.D. Pa. 1986);
Bruner v. Hines, 324 So. 2d 265, 269-70 (Ala. 1976); Hickox v. Bell, 552 N.E.2d 1133, 1144
(Ill. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 555 N.E.2d 376 (Ill. 1990); Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc.
v. Robbins, 865 S.W.2d 361, 367 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Micro-Margins, Inc. v. Gregory, 434
N.W.2d 97, 103 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
80. In Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 798 F. Supp. 692, 699-700 (S.D. Fla. 1992), on
which the example in the text is based, the court did not analyze the propriety of the new
location according to the materiality standard but applied an amorphous standard requiring reasonable conduct on the part of the franchisor.
[W]here the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is, in fact, implied into a
franchise agreement, decisions by a franchisor as to where to establish new
franchises must be made in good faith and in a reasonable manner so that a
party's right to enjoy the fruits of the contract is not obviated.
Id. at 697 n.9. The court did not resolve whether Burger King's conduct was reasonable,
leaving that for the trial court, where Burger King "should be prepared to defend its position on a good faith-that is, reasonable conduct-basis." Id. at 700.
81. "A contract is a mutually advantageous cooperative venture according to rules, by
which each party voluntarily restricts his or her own liberty in ways necessary to yield
advantages for both parties." Stephen J. Burton, Default Principles,Legitimacy, and the
Authority of a Contract,3 S. CAL. INTERDISCPLINARY L.J. 115, 161 (1993). "[T]he dominating motivation of commercial contractors is to induce cooperative risk reduction."
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their freedom to act inconsistently with the terms of the contract.8 It
would be antithetical to that cooperative spirit to allow one party to
defeat the other party's contractual purpose merely because the terms
of the contract do not prohibit it.
This standard focuses on the parties' contractual purposes, and
83
thus bears a semantic similarity to the current purpose approach.
However, unlike the current approach, it acknowledges that the parties have distinct and potentially conflicting purposes and defines
when defendant's promotion of 84his own purpose will be deemed an
undue intrusion upon plaintiff's.
Cases will occasionally arise when defendant must either defeat
plaintiff's contractual purpose by engaging in particular conduct or defeat his own contractual purpose by refraining from such conduct. In
those cases, defendant would not be required to protect plaintiff's
contractual purpose at the expense of his own. Self-defeating altruism
would not be required. To illustrate, assume defendant leased commercial property from plaintiff to operate a department store with
rent equal to a percentage of the store's gross revenue. 85 As a result
of a subsequent change in demographics, some of the store's operations became so unprofitable that they eliminated the profitability of
the entire store. Relocating the unprofitable operations would cause a
material contractual injury to plaintiff by reducing the rental revenues
below her carrying costs. If, however, defendant did not relocate the
unprofitable operations, the department store would remain unprofitable, causing him material injury. Defendant's decision to relocate
would not violate the covenant of good faith because his relocation
was necessary to avoid defeating his own contractual purpose. If,
however, defendant relocated merely for more favorable rental terms,
but his operations were profitable at plaintiff's premises, defendant's
conduct would violate the covenant of good faith because defendant
was not avoiding material injury to himself. 86
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 597, 605 (1990).

82. See Burton, supra note 81, at 161.
83. See supra subpart II.E.
84. See Baird, supra note 48, and accompanying text.
85. The example in the text is based on the facts of Grisaffi v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 43
F.3d 982, 983 (5th Cir. 1995). Many authorities have addressed the question whether the
covenant of good faith is breached when a defendant, having agreed to pay rent to plaintiff
based on a percentage of defendant's gross revenues derived from operations at the leased
premises, discontinues or curtails those operations, thereby reducing or eliminating plaintiffs rent. See cases cited infra note 86; see also Burton, supra note 8, at 384-85 (commercial percentage lease cases invoke the covenant of good faith).
86. Although none of the percentage lease decisions explicitly recognizes a defendant's right to exercise discretion so as to protect himself from material harm, defendant's
reason for discontinuing or shutting down operations at the rented premises is nevertheless
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(b) Reason to Know

Under this standard, defendant must have reason to know that
his conduct would cause plaintiff material contractual injury. Defendant would have reason to know if he had information from which a
person of ordinary intelligence would infer that material injury was
probable. 87 "Reason to know," unlike "should have known," imposes
no duty to inquire about the true state of facts, 88 thereby freeing defendant from the burden of ascertaining the effect of contemplated
conduct when it did not appear likely that such conduct would cause
plaintiff material injury.
In order for defendant to have reason to know that his conduct
would cause plaintiff material contractual injury, he must not only
have reason to know of plaintiff's contractual purpose but also that his
conduct would defeat that purpose. It would be necessary for defenda factor in many decisions. In Grisaffi, 43 F.3d at 984, for example, the court recognized
that under Louisiana law a percentage lessee may close an unprofitable store without violating the covenant of good faith, while a relocation to another store to take advantage of
more favorable lease terms would violate the covenant of good faith. See also Casa
D'Angelo, Inc. v. A & R Realty Co., 553 N.E.2d 515, 518-19 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (lack of
resources and personnel to continue business justified closing); Piggly Wiggly S., Inc. v.
Heard, 399 S.E.2d 244,247 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that defendant's practice of keeping premises vacant merely to reduce competition with defendant's nearby store breached
covenant of good faith); Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Butch Lewis Prods., 808 P.2d 919, 923-24
n.6 (Nev. 1991) (concluding in dictum that it would be bad faith to divert business from
premises solely to reduce rental payment tied to percentage of gross revenue); Downtown
Assocs. v. Burrows Bros., 518 N.E.2d 564, 567-68 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (finding that relocation was justified because leased premises were inadequate to handle defendant's shipping and receiving needs).
87. This definition of reason to know falls between the definitions provided by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Restatement (Second) of Agency. "'Reason to
know' means that the actor has knowledge of facts from which a reasonable man...
would either infer the existence of the fact in question or would regard its existence as so
highly probable that his conduct would be predicated upon the assumption that the fact did
exist." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 crmt. a (1965). "A person has reason to
know of a fact if he has information from which a person of ordinary intelligence...
would infer that the fact in question exists or that there is such a substantial chance of its
existence that, if exercising reasonable care with reference to the matter in question, his
action would be predicated upon the assumption of its possible existence." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §

9 cmt. d (1958); cf

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

19

cmt. b (1979) ("A person has reason to know a fact... if he has information from which a
person of ordinary intelligence would infer that the fact in question does or will exist.").
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 cmt. a (1965) ("'Should know' indicates
that the actor is under a duty to another to use reasonable diligence to ascertain the existence or non-existence of the fact in question .... "); see supra note 87. When conduct is
apparently innocuous because of plaintiff's failure to disclose special circumstances, it
should not be necessary for defendant to inquire whether that conduct would be injurious
to plaintiff. It should not be incumbent upon defendant to undertake an inefficient fishing
expedition by having to inquire of the plaintiff about the potential consequences of all
conduct not covered by the terms of the contract.
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ant to have reason to know of plaintiff's contractual purpose prior to
the contract's formation and reason to know his conduct would defeat
that purpose prior to his engaging in the conduct.
Because this standard applies only when defendant has reason to
know of plaintiff's contractual purpose prior to the contract's formation, plaintiff has an incentive to disclose that purpose when it is not
otherwise apparent. Such disclosure provides defendant an opportunity to determine whether he is willing to restrict his conduct to honor
plaintiff's purpose. 89 Plaintiff's incentive to disclose her purpose
would be similar to that imposed by the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,90
a penalty default 91 rule designed to encourage the obligee's disclosure 92 of her special circumstances unknown to the obligor by denying
her recovery of consequential damages resulting from these special
93
circumstances.
No disclosure of plaintiff's purpose prior to formation would be
necessary if the terms of the contract or the underlying circumstances
made that purpose apparent to defendant. For example, assume that
the lessor of a shopping mall leased premises to defendant's supermarket chain. The lease provided that defendant was the anchor ten89. Defendant's risks under the contract are increased to the extent that his ability to
engage in opportunistic behavior is decreased. Disclosure of these risks is important. See
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 89, 117 n.45 (1985) ("Disclosure ... allows the other party to take extra
precautions or to charge appropriate compensation for bearing increased risk"); see also
Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge, Knowledge About Legal Sanctions, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 261, 291 (1993) ("Consider two important goals of contract law: ensuring an accurately priced transaction by encouraging the identification and disclosure of relevant information and, in long-term contracts, reducing opportunistic behavior").
90. 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. D. 1854).
91. Professors Ayres and Gertner coined the phrase "penalty default" to describe a
rule that would encourage desired conduct or discourage undesired conduct by use of a
penalty. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97-104 (1989).
92. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 127 (4th ed. 1992); Ayres &
Gertner, supra note 91, at 101-02; John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for
Breach of Contract,1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277,296 (1972); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargainingwith
Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A Default Rule for PrecontractualNegotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 684 (1993); Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts,47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263,
1292 (1993).
93. According to Hadley, the obligee cannot recover consequential damages resulting
from special circumstances unless those circumstances were communicated, prior to the
formation of the contract, to the obligor. 156 Eng. Rep. at 151. The Restatement (Second)
of Contracts has modified the language of Hadley to provide that consequential damages
may be recovered if they were foreseeable as "a probable result of [the) breach [when the
contract was made] ... as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of
events, that the party in breach had reason to know." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(2) (1979).
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ant but was otherwise silent about the use of the premises. 94 After
opening a supermarket, defendant relocated it to a nearby neighborhood.95 Rather than terminate the lease with plaintiff, thereby allowing a competing supermarket to open at plaintiff's premises,
defendant chose to utilize the premises to operate a warehouse box
store.96 This use defeated plaintiff's contractual purpose of having the
anchor tenant's premises used to draw a high volume of customers to
the mall. 97 By the very fact of being the anchor tenant, defendant
would have reason to know of that purpose 98 and disclosure would not
be necessary.
Plaintiff's disclosure of her purpose would be necessary on the
following variation of the facts of the previous case. Assume that defendant did not relocate but, to plaintiff's surprise, used the premises
to operate a high-traffic department store. If plaintiff's undisclosed
purpose was to have a supermarket as anchor tenant rather than a
department store so that it would pose no competitive threat to the
other retail tenants, plaintiff could not successfully claim that her contractual purpose was defeated by defendant's choice of operations, as
defendant would not have reason to know of that purpose without
disclosure.
Although defendant must have reason to know of plaintiff's purpose before contract formation, defendant need only have reason to
know prior to his conduct that his conduct would defeat that purpose.
In contrast to plaintiff's purpose for entering into the contract, which
will invariably be known by plaintiff at the time of the contract's formation, plaintiff will frequently not know at the time of the contract's
formation the conduct that defendant is contemplating or the consequences that conduct will have upon her. 99 Therefore, the law should
94. This example is based on the facts of Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. v. Smith's Food
& Drug Ctrs., 889 P.2d 445, 448-49 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
95. The location of defendant's new store was one and one-half miles from defend-

ant's first store. Id at 448.
96. Id at 448, 452.
97. According to the court, Smith's role as the "anchor tenant" at the center was to
generate significant customer traffic which was necessary to the financial health and operation of the Olympus Hills Shopping Center. Id. at 452. Smith's box store generated less
than 10% of the proceeds generated by its supermarket and customer traffic at the shopping center was down sixty percent after the opening of the box store. See id. at 453.
98. In its decision, the court did not inquire whether Smith's had reason to know of
Olympus Hills's contractual purpose. Instead, it decided the good faith issue from Olympus Hills's perspective, based on whether Olympus Hills justifiably expected that Smith's
would select a reasonable economic use for the premises. Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d at 451.
Since reasonable minds could differ on whether Smith's acted in violation of Olympus
Hills's reasonable expectation, the court held that the issue of good faith was properly
submitted to the jury. Id. at 451-52.
99. "[Plarties do not anticipate all future contingencies. This is particularly so in longterm contracting, because there are inevitable cognitive limitations on the human mind's
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not impose a penalty upon plaintiff for failing to disclose at the time of
the contract's formation the consequences of defendant's future conduct. 100 Rather, the law should impose upon defendant an obligation
to adjust his conduct according to the circumstances. At some time
prior to his conduct, however, defendant must have reason to know of
its material impact on plaintiff's contractual interests in order to violate this standard. This requirement is necessary in order to prevent
defendant from being liable by surprise and afford him a reasonable
opportunity to avoid breach. 10 1
10 2
Because there is no bright line to demarcate material injury,
cases will arise under this standard when the materiality of injury and
plaintiff's reason to know of it are in dispute. Nevertheless, the test of
information processing capacity." John C. Coffee Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-PlayerGame, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1505 (1990). The inability to anticipate
contingencies is the reason that default terms are necessary. "[A] key purpose of statesupplied terms is to save parties from the necessity of formulating a complete set of express
conditions for contingencies that may be difficult to anticipate, or are at least easily overlooked." Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261,
270 (1985).
100. Defendant's intent to engage in particular conduct may be unknown to plaintiff at
the time of formation of the contract. Defendant himself may have had no such intent at
that time and may have been induced to engage in the conduct by circumstances arising
subsequent to formation. Even if plaintiff knew at the time of formation that defendant
anticipated engaging in particular conduct, she may not have known that it would cause
her material injury. For example, assume in the restaurant franchise case that defendant
opened the new restaurant five miles away from plaintiff. Plaintiff may not have reasonably anticipated at the time of formation that defendant would open another restaurant in
that vicinity. Defendant himself may not have so anticipated. Even if plaintiff had known
of defendant's intention, she might not have known that her franchise would be so marginal that a new restaurant five miles away would cause it to be unprofitable.
101. Whether this requirement was satisfied would be the critical issue in resolving a
hypothetical based on a variation of the facts of Kansas Baptist Convention v. Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership, 864 P.2d 204 (Kan. 1993). Assume a gas well operator had a contract with the owners of land and mineral rights whereby the operator had been given
discretion, after initial drilling, to drill subsequent wells at the expense of the owners. After the initial drilling, the operator opted to drill a subsequent drainage well for the purpose of maximizing gas production. However, the subsequent drilling caused the investors
to forfeit their interests, thereby defeating their contractual purpose of engaging in a
profit-making transaction, because the cost of drilling the drainage well exceeded the income that the investors would ever recover from the operating wells. If drilling costs exceed income for the reason that plaintiffs had contracted to sell the gas output to third
parties for abnormally low prices, it would be irrelevant that defendant had no reason to
know prior to formation of the contract about the price limitation and the resulting adverse
economic effect that his drilling would have on plaintiffs. Rather, what is relevant is
whether he had reason to know of it, through plaintiffs' disclosure or otherwise, prior to his
conduct.
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 cmt. a (1979) (acknowledging
that the determination of materiality cannot be made with precision).
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materiality has, in other contexts, proven
to be workable and should
03
be similarly effective in this context.
(2) Failure to Utilize a Less Harsh Alternative

Defendant would violate the covenant when he engages in conduct that injures plaintiff's contractual interests if he had reason to
know that there was an alternative which would have provided him
essentially the same benefits while substantially reducing plaintiff's
contractual injuries.
Although this standard does not require defendant to give equal
weight to plaintiff's contractual interests or to balance his gains
against her losses, it does require that he accomplish his goals by
avoiding conduct that injures plaintiff if it can be done at minimal or
no additional cost to defendant. This standard imposes a base level of
contractual cooperation by preventing defendant from gratuitously injuring plaintiff and by requiring him to modify his conduct to avoid
contractual injuries to plaintiff that are not necessary to promote his
own legitimate self-interest. The fact that the alternative conduct
would entail insignificant incidental expense would not relieve defendant from his obligations under this standard. Requiring defendant to substantially reduce plaintiff's contractual injuries when it can
be done at minimal cost to defendant promotes economic efficiency, a
recognized tenet of contract law, 104 because if there is a less harsh
alternative it will necessarily create a greater net benefit to the
parties. 5The operation of this rule is illustrated by a variation of the facts
of the restaurant franchise case. Assume the new restaurant reduced,
but did not eliminate, the profitability of plaintiff's franchise. 06 If defendant was aware of an alternative, more distant location for the new
restaurant which would have given defendant essentially the same fi103. See supra notes 77-79.
104. See A.

MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 25

(1983); Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Revisited. The Ballad
of Willie & Lucie, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1341, 1427 (1995); Michael 1. Meyerson, The Efficient
Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REv. 583,
587-88 (1990); Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in ContractLaw: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 89 (1977) ("If the

purpose of the law of contracts is to effectuate the desires of the contracting parties, then
the proper criterion for evaluating the rules of contract law is surely that of economic
efficiency.").
, 105. "The term 'efficiency' has a meaning to the economist that differs from its plain
English usage. In general, a situation is considered economically efficient if it maximizes
aggregate benefits less aggregate costs." Meyerson, supra note 104, at 624.
106. Because the profitability of the restaurant was not eliminated, the materiality
standard would not be violated, and plaintiff would have to seek relief under a different
standard.
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nancial benefits and which would have reduced substantially plaintiff's
loss of business, his failure to choose this less harsh alternative would
violate the covenant.
Defendant must have reason to know that a less harsh alternative
to his conduct was available. 10 7 Defendant need not inquire about the
presence of less harsh alternatives, 10 8 but if he knows of facts from
which he could have reasonably concluded that a less harsh alternative was available, he cannot close his eyes to those facts and injure
plaintiff's contractual interests through indifference. For example, assume that defendant, as a secured lender, exercised his discretion to
foreclose on the collateral of a defaulting plaintiff, even though plaintiff had obtained a buyer who was willing to purchase the collateral at
a sum that would fully compensate defendant while allowing plaintiff
to retain a portion of the proceeds that she would not be able to obtain through a foreclosure sale. 109 Defendant would violate the covenant by blocking the proposed voluntary sale if it were apparent that
the foreclosure sale would deprive plaintiff of a portion of the proceeds and that no reduction in defendant's contractual benefits would
accrue by accepting plaintiff's proposal.' 10 But if this information
were not apparent, defendant would have no reason to know that a
less harsh alternative existed, and his foreclosure sale would not violate the covenant.
This standard would apply when defendant had discretion to engage in particular conduct, but chose a manner that was more injurious than necessary. The following case exemplifies that situation."'
Defendant conferred upon plaintiff the exclusive right to retail defendant's product line within a designated territory and retained dis107. For the meaning of the term "reason to know" see supra note 87.
108. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
109. The example in the text is based on the facts of Uptown Heights Assocs. v.
Seafirst Corp., 891 P.2d 639 (Or. 1994).
110. A case in which a foreclosing lender's good faith was in issue when it refused to
permit a voluntary sale in lieu of foreclosure was Bennett v. Genoa Ag Ctr., Inc., 154 B.R.
140, 148 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1992). In that case defendant lender exercised its contractual
right to foreclose on plaintiff borrower's farmland. Id. at 143. Plaintiff then entered into a
contract with a third party to sell the property. Id. at 144. Defendant refused to accept
plaintiff's plan to retain $3,700 of the sale proceeds and remit the balance to defendant. Id.
The bankruptcy court initially held that defendant had breached the covenant of good
faith by refusing plaintiffs plan. Id. at 148-49. This holding is consistent with how the case
would be resolved under the proposed less harsh alternative standard because defendant,
at no additional expense, would have gotten more by accepting plaintiff's proposal than by
foreclosing. Id. at 148. However, the court later reconsidered this holding and determined
that the covenant of good faith had not been breached because defendant had an express
contractual right to foreclose and the implied covenant of good faith could not detract
from that express right. Id. at 154.
111. The example in the text is based on the facts of Hentze v. Unverfehrt, 604 N.E.2d
536, 537-38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
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cretion to terminate the relationship. 112 Pursuant to that contract,
plaintiff accepted orders from customers who resided in another
dealer's territory." 3 As a result of complaints from the other dealer,
defendant engaged in a smear campaign to drive plaintiff out of business. 114 Assuming that defendant could have achieved the same bene5 defendant's conduct
fits merely by exercising the termination right,"
6
would violate the covenant of good faith."
If defendant were motivated solely by spite or ill will, he could
not successfully argue that he should be excused from seeking a less
harsh alternative on the ground that reducing plaintiffs injury in any
way would deprive him of the benefit of satisfying his spite. Defendant would have to show that his conduct was motivated by a legitimate
business interest and that there was no less harsh alternative to promote that interest. The tort of intentional interference with contractual relations holds persons liable who attempt to undermine
another's contractual relations with a third party with no interest in
doing so except spite or ill will. 117 If one is liable in tort for maliciously undermining a contract with a third party, he should be found
in violation of this standard when his sole motivation" 8 is to mali112. Both parties had the contractual right to terminate the contract with or without
cause. Id- at 539.
113. The dealer was told by defendant not to turn away business from other areas
outside his own. Id. at 538.
114. Id.at 540.
115. In fact, defendant had the right to terminate because the contract was terminable
at will. Id. at 539. For a discussion of how the authors would treat contracts terminable at
will, see infra text accompanying notes 191-93, 198.
116. The court's analysis did not employ the less harsh alternative standard but found
bad faith from a combination of defendant's actions, including the smear campaign, defendant's refusal to communicate with or assist plaintiff for several months, and defendant's contradictory and misleading communications to plaintiff on the subject of whether
defendant intended to terminate the agreement. Id. at 540. The court observed that if
defendant had merely terminated the agreement, as it was entitled to do under the contract, then there would have been no bad faith. Id.
117. See, e.g., Gailliard v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1085, 1089 (D.S.C. 1995);
Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. LeDuc, 814 F. Supp. 832, 839-40 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Soltani
v. Smith, 812 F. Supp. 1280, 1296-97 (D.N.H. 1993); Rogers v. Nail, 583 So. 2d 271, 272
(Ala. 1991); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Aurora Air Serv., Inc., 604 P.2d 1090, 1093
(Alaska 1979); Ethyl Corp. v. Baiter, 386 So. 2d 1220, 1224-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
King v. Driscoll, 638 N.E.2d 488, 494-95 (Mass. 1994); Franklin v. Harris, 762 S.W.2d 847,
849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Ferraro v. Finger Lakes Racing Ass'n, 583 N.Y.S.2d 66, 67 (App.
Div. 1992); Wagoner v. Elkin City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 440 S.E.2d 119, 124 (N.C. Ct. App.
1994).
118. As with the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations, if defendant
had a legitimate business interest for engaging in his conduct, he would not be in violation
of this standard even though his conduct was motivated partly by animosity toward plaintiff. See, ag., Alyeska Pipeline,604 P.2d at 1093; Ethyl Corp.,386 So. 2d at 1225; Wagoner,
440 S.E.2d at 124.
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ciously undermine his own contracting partner's contractual
benefits. 119
Permitting a defendant to forego a less harsh alternative only
when it promotes his legitimate business interests is consistent with
the line of cases holding that a lessor's expressly reserved power to
withhold consent to an assignment of a lease cannot be denied for
arbitrary reasons and must be in furtherance of a legitimate business
interest. 120 Because a lessor who denies consent to an assignment for
other than legitimate business reasons could have derived essentially
the same protectable benefits from the less harsh alternative of granting consent, his denial of consent would be in violation of this
standard.
Occasionally this standard will require that defendant give plaintiff prior notice of his intent to engage in particular conduct. If, for
example, defendant had a requirements contract with plaintiff, and after the formation of the contract his requirements increased significantly, he would be obligated to give plaintiff reasonable notice in
order to afford her an opportunity to increase production or obtain
alternative sources of supply. 12' Defendant's failure to give notice
prior to increasing his requirements would constitute a violation of the
covenant because notice would have substantially reduced the likelihood of plaintiff's contractual injuries at minimal or no expense.
(3) All Other Cases

In cases that are not covered by the above two standards, defendant's decision to pursue his own commercial interests should be
deemed commercially reasonable even though his conduct may cause
injury to plaintiff's contractual interests.
It might be argued that in such residual cases commercial reasonableness should be determined based on whether defendant had reason to know that his conduct would cause a greater loss to plaintiff
119. Because the covenant of good faith would not apply to conduct that is pursuant to
an express grant of absolute discretion, a spiteful exercise of that discretion would not
violate the covenant. For example, termination of an employee induced solely by personal
animosity would be permitted under a contract terminable at will. See infra text accompanying notes 191-93, 198.
120. See, e.g., Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Lavender, 934 F.2d 290, 293 (11th Cir. 1991);
Fernandez v. Vazquez, 397 So. 2d 1171, 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Funk v. Funk, 633
P.2d 586, 589 (Idaho 1981); Newman v. Hinky Dinky Omaha-Lincoln, Inc., 427 N.W.2d 50,
55 (Neb. 1988).
121. Advance notification by the buyer to the seller of the buyer's requirements is not
expressly required by U.C.C. § 2-306, the U.C.C. provision dealing with requirements contracts, nor by its Official Comments. See U.C.C. § 2-306 (1994). The proposed rule therefore represents an expansion of the seller's express rights under the U.C.C. in a
requirements contract.
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than defendant would have sustained by foregoing the conduct. 122
This argument should fail, however, because such a balancing would
frequently be contrary to the intent of the parties and would be
unfeasible.
When the contract confers discretionary powers on defendant,
there is frequently a tacit understanding that he will give priority to
his own self-interest.'23 Plaintiff might willingly confer this broad discretionary power as a trade-off for more favorable contract terms in
return. To prohibit defendant from exercising discretion in a manner
that would cause more harm to plaintiff than benefit to defendant
would, therefore, frequently be contrary to the intent of parties.
Such a balancing approach would be unfeasible because of the
difficulty of measuring and comparing the parties' respective losses. If
the standard of measurement is purely monetary, it is often extremely
difficult to assess the dollar effect of particular conduct upon the parties. 24 More importantly, it is not clear that a comparison of monetary harm with monetary benefits is an appropriate standard for
122. Professor Scott postulates that a strategy of joint maximization of benefits and
mutual risk reduction dominate the mindset of contracting parties.
If we assume rationality, then it follows that, regardless of the risk attitudes of
particular parties, the dominant strategy for contractual risk allocation is to maximize the expected value of the contract for both parties. Only by allocating risks
in order to maximize the joint expected benefits from their contractual relationship can the parties hope to maximize their individual utility. Any deviation from
joint maximization generates an inefficient and thus an unstable contract.
Scott, supra note 81, at 602.
123. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 41, at 540, 560.
124. Frequently the determination of the economic impact of defendant's conduct requires an assessment of the gains that defendant will ultimately acquire and the profits that
plaintiff will ultimately lose by that conduct. The calculation of future profits or losses is
"inevitably speculative to some degree." Haven Assocs. v. Donro Realty Corp., 503
N.Y.S.2d 826, 830 (App. Div. 1986). In making that calculation, the court and jury necessarily "enter 'into the realm of the imprecise and uncertain."' Park v. El Paso Bd. of Realtors, 764 F.2d 1053, 1066 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1102 (1986) (quoting
Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 45 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077
(1972)). The courts are willing to calculate damages based on future profits or losses,
notwithstanding a degree of uncertainty in such a calculation, when defendant, by his
wrongdoing, created the uncertainty. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327
U.S. 251, 264 (1946) (stating that the jury may reasonably eliminate damage according to
"relevant data" when the defendant's own wrong renders uncertain an exact computation
of damages). Once defendant's wrongdoing has been established, any error in estimation
affects only the amount of damages that plaintiff will recover. If, however, the determination whether defendant violated the covenant is based upon a comparison of defendant's
future gains with plaintiff's future losses, tolerating uncertainty in those amounts cannot be
justified on the premise that defendant was a wrongdoer, because the determination of
wrongdoing would depend upon the calculation. And if there is an error in calculation, the
effect will not merely be to give plaintiff more or less damages than those to which she was
entitled; it may result in the finding of liability when in fact none should be found, or the
failure to find liability when it should be found. As a result, basing the determination
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determining when conduct violates the covenant. 125 But measuring
losses from a qualitative perspective, such as by the degree to which
each party's purpose is impaired, is also extremely difficult. Although
contract law can distinguish between material and immaterial injuries, 126 there is no workable method for measuring and comparing impairment to a plaintiff's contractual purpose with avoided impairment
to a defendant's contractual purpose.
The determination of commercial reasonableness under the cove-

nant would be governed solely by the above two standards; however, a
plaintiff could still establish through extrinsic evidence

27

that the par-

ties intended greater obligations of cooperation than would be imposed by those standards. Furthermore, defendant may still violate
the covenant if his conduct involved dishonesty, despite the commercial reasonableness of such conduct.
B.

Dishonesty

The rules encompassed within this category seek to prevent defendant from causing contractual injury through deceptive or disingenuous means. They impose minimum levels of integrity in the
performance of contracts.
Two patterns of conduct presently recognized to violate the covenant of good faith properly fall within this category: first, when defendant's duty to perform is dependent upon his personal satisfaction
and he misrepresents his dissatisfaction; 128 and second, when defendant deliberately prevents plaintiff's performance and then attempts to
take advantage of her nonperformance by disingenuously claiming

whether conduct violates the covenant solely upon economic efficiency is not only unfeasible, but dangerous.
125. See Jean W. Bums, Vertical Restraints, Efficienc , and the Real World, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 624-30 (1993) (noting that to focus solely on economic efficiency in
creating default rules for contract law ignores the reality that fairness, too, is a relevant
factor and fairness frequently depends upon criteria that cannot be measured by a simple
comparison of the respective monetary injuries and gains of the parties).
126. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 27.
Proof of dishonesty in this context will be difficult. However, if defendant's claimed
dissatisfaction is objectively unreasonable, dishonesty may be inferred from that fact alone.
For example, assume defendant homeowner enters into a home improvement contract
under which defendant can terminate the contract if he is not personally satisfied with
plaintiff's performance. Although plaintiff complies with the objective specifications of the
contract, defendant nevertheless terminates the contract claiming dissatisfaction and hires
another contractor at a cheaper price. Under these circumstances, a court may find that
the true reason for termination was to obtain the work at a cheaper price and that defendant was in fact dishonest and in violation of the covenant when he claimed dissatisfaction.
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breach.' 29 In addition to those patterns, the following types of conduct should be regarded as dishonest.
(1)

Dishonest Evaluation of Facts or Circumstances

When the contract confers discretion upon defendant to determine whether particular facts or circumstances exist, his misrepresentation of the determination would violate the covenant.
This rule would simply extend the presently recognized rule concerning dishonest expressions of dissatisfaction to cases in which defendant dishonestly expresses his evaluation of facts or circumstances.
There is no reason to treat these two situations differently.
The following case illustrates the operation of the proposed standard. 130 Plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant Motion Picture Association of America (M.P.A.A.), allowing defendant the
discretion to rate plaintiff's movie according to stated criteria. 131 Defendant categorized plaintiff's movie as X-rated, thereby severely lir-,
iting the potential audience. 32 If defendant's rating of plaintiff's
movie was not based on defendant's honest belief, but rather reflected
a practice by defendant to rate more strictly movies submitted by
33 defendant's dishonthose who were not members of the M.P.A.A.,'
34
est rating would violate the covenant.
Another example of this standard would involve an employment
contract terminable for good cause 35 in which the employer is given
129.

130.
Picture
131.
criteria
132.
133.

See supra note 27.

The example in the text is based on the facts of Maljack Prods., Inc. v. Motion
Ass'n of Am., Civ. A. No. 90-1121 JGP, 1992 WL 78735 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 1992).
According to the actual facts of the case, the plaintiff failed to allege what those
were. Id. at *3.
Id. at *1.
Plaintiff alleged that its movie, Henry: Portraitof a Serial Killer, was rated in a

discriminatory manner in comparison with more violent films that received an R rating. Id.
at *3.Plaintiff also claimed that the reason for the discrimination was that plaintiff was not
a member of the Motion Picture Association of America. Id. at *4 n.4.
134. Although the court's discussion indicates that the covenant of good faith would
have been violated if defendant had deliberately misapplied stated ratings criteria merely
because plaintiff was not a member of the Motion Picture Association of America, the
court actually held that plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged facts from which defendant's
bad faith discrimination against it could be found. Plaintiff did not allege any ratings criteria that defendant had failed to apply or had misapplied. Plaintiff's allegation that other
films more violent than its own had received more lenient ratings was insufficient to support a claim of bad faith. A simple mistake by defendant would be consistent with that
allegation. Id. at *3.
135. An employment contract that can be terminated only for good cause is subject to
the covenant of good faith. See Schultz v. Spraylat Corp., 866 F. Supp. 1535, 1540 (C.D.
Cal. 1994) (holding that burden is on plaintiff to demonstrate that a "covenant of good
faith and fair dealing" existed and that plaintiff's termination by defendant without cause
represented a breach of that covenant); Barrett v. Asarco Inc., 799 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Mont.
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discretion to base salary increases upon his evaluation of specified criteria. If plaintiff is denied a raise based on defendant's personal animosity toward her, rather than on the specified criteria, defendant's
136
dishonest evaluation would violate this standard.
Even when defendant honestly believes that his determination of
facts or circumstances is correct, his conduct should nonetheless be
deemed dishonest if he refused to allow plaintiff the opportunity to

present evidence that might reasonably have induced him to make a
contrary determination. The failure to consider such information
demonstrates defendant's lack of integrity, indicates that he does not
want to know the truth, 137 and amounts to dishonesty. The following
case illustrates this point. 138 Defendant Educational Testing Service
administers the Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT") and in its contract

with students retains discretion to cancel test scores of any student

whom it determines to have cheated. 139 Plaintiff, a high school stu-

dent, twice took the SAT and achieved a dramatically higher score on
the second test. 140 Defendant's experts checked plaintiff's answer

1990) (stating that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing hinges upon objective
manifestations by defendant that would lead plaintiff to reasonably believe his job was
secure and he would receive fair treatment). When a contract grants rights of tenure, by
prohibiting discharge absent good cause, the covenant should limit the employer's discretionary powers over other aspects of the contractual relationship, such as salary. See, e.g.,
Kirsner v. University of Miami, 362 So. 2d 449, 451 (Fla. 1978) (holding that plaintiffs
tenure rights did not affect the defendant university's right to reduce the portion of his
salary that represented only his administrative duties); Rose v. Elmhurst College, 379
N.E.2d 791, 792 (Ill. 1978) (involving tenured professor who was properly terminated because of declining enrollment); Keiser v. State Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 630 P.2d
194, 199 (Mont. 1981) (emphasizing that the institution has the power to define what aspects of a position are tenured at the time the tenure contract is drafted).
136. This standard would not prohibit defendant from giving a dishonest explanation
of the reason for his conduct if his discretion regarding that conduct was absolute and
therefore not limited by conditions or criteria. See infra notes 190-200 and accompanying
text. In such a context defendant's dishonesty has caused plaintiff no contractual injury
and should afford no basis for relief. That would be the case when in an employment
contract terminable at will the employer terminated the employee for the purported reason
that her position had been eliminated, when in fact the employer's reason for terminating
her was a personality conflict. Although the employer was dishonest, that dishonesty
caused no contractual injury to plaintiff because defendant had a right to terminate her for
the true reason.
137. This rule does not require defendant to expend time or money to investigate the
truth. It only requires that defendant reasonably consider the information plaintiff seeks to
present. In this sense, the rule is consistent with the earlier proposed "reason to know"
standard. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
138. The example in the text is based on the facts of Dalton v. Educational Testing
Serv., 614 N.Y.S.2d 742, 743 (App. Div. 1994).
139. Id. at 744.
140. Plaintiff's combined verbal and math score on his first SAT taken in May of 1991
was 620. Id. at 743. On his second SAT taken in November of 1991 his combined score
was 1030. Id.
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sheets from both tests and concluded that the handwriting was inconsistent. 14 1 Based on its determination that the student had cheated,

defendant canceled plaintiffs test scores and would not release them
to academic institutions. 142 Defendant refused to consider plaintiff's
abundant, credible evidence that no cheating had occurred. 43 That
evidence might reasonably have induced defendant to make a contrary determination, and therefore, defendant's refusal would violate

the covenant. 144
Defendant should not escape this standard by asserting that
plaintiff's evidence would not have induced him to make a contrary
determination. Defendant's post hoc assertion is of doubtful veracity
and unverifiable. 45 Therefore, the determination of whether the relevant criteria are satisfied or the relevant factual conditions exist
should be made not by defendant but by the court. In the SAT case,
the determination of whether plaintiff cheated would be made by the
court based on all the evidence, including that which plaintiff was denied the opportunity to present. 46
(2)

Inducing Inadvertent Surrender of Contractual Rights

Defendant would violate the covenant when he
duct with the purpose and effect of inducing plaintiff
surrender her contractual rights.
This rule would not be violated by defendant's
apprise plaintiff of her contractual rights. It seeks to

engaged in conto inadvertently
mere failure to
prevent defend-

141. Id
142. Id. at 744.
143. The evidence offered by plaintiff included the following: affidavits from ETS
proctors that plaintiff had attended the November 1991 SAT; affidavits from other test
takers who had seen him at the November 1991 SAT; documentation that plaintiff had
mononucleosis at the time of the May 1991 SAT; plaintiff's enrollment in a six-week review
course prior to the November SAT; plaintiff's honors record in high school; and an affidavit from plaintiffs handwriting expert indicating that the handwriting on plaintiff's May
and November tests was consistent. Id. at 743-44.
144. The court held that defendant Educational Testing Service had violated the covenant of good faith by "ignoring Dalton's evidence without even initiating a preliminary
investigation." I&. at 744.
145. "[Pjost hoc justification should be considered suspect." Mitchell v. Commission
on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 10 F.3d 123, 135 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 15192 Thirteen Mile Rd., Inc. v. City of Warren, 626 F. Supp. 803, 825 (E.D. Mich. 1985)); accord
Washington v. Murray, 4 F.3d 1285, 1288-89 (4th Cir. 1993); Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1045 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[t]he trial judge was
correctly dubious of the seductive logic of post-hoc explanation").
146. Although the proposed rule would require the court to determine whether the
plaintiff had in fact cheated, the court in Dalton v. Educational Testing Service made no
such determination. The court simply ordered defendant Educational Testing Service to
release the test scores on the grounds that defendant had violated the covenant of good
faith by refusing to consider plaintiff's evidence. Dalton, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 743-44.
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ant from engaging in affirmative conduct undertaken for the purpose
of entrapping plaintiff into inadvertently surrendering contractual
rights. Such conduct is a sophisticated form of dishonesty. 147 The following case demonstrates the application of this standard. 148 A longterm shopping center lease provided that lessee could request negotiations with lessor for the purpose of having lessor finance leasehold
improvements. 14 9 Paragraph 34 of the lease provided that, if such negotiations failed, lessee had the option to purchase the property at a
price computed according to a predetermined formula. 150 Many years
later,' 51 lessee contacted lessor to purchase the property but considered lessor's offer of $3 million to be excessive. 52 The paragraph 34
purchase option formula, however, yielded the bargain price of $1 million. Lessee therefore requested negotiations for financing, hoping
that lessor had forgotten paragraph 34 and would cause the purchase
option to be invoked by refusing to negotiate. 153 Lessee's hopes were
realized. 154 Under the proposed rule, defendant lessee's conduct
155
would violate the covenant.
147. This conduct constitutes dishonesty in its narrow sense in that defendant seeks to
deceive plaintiff. See supra note 60.
148. The example in the text is based on the facts of Market St. Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 591-92 (7th Cir. 1991).
149. In 1968, J.C. Penney entered into a sale and leaseback arrangement with General
Electric Pension Trust, whereby J.C. Penney sold properties to the Trust and leased them
back for a period of 25 years. Id. at 591. As part of that arrangement, the trust agreed to
negotiate the financing of improvements desired by J.C. Penney. Id.
150. The formula for determining the price at which J.C. Penney could buy back the
property provided a base price approximately equal to the amount of the original sale price
under the sale and leaseback, plus six percent for each year elapsed since the initial sale.
Id.
151. In 1987, J.C. Penney assigned the lease to Market Street Associates Limited Partnership. Id. In 1988, twenty years after the inception of the lease, Market Street Associates got an opportunity to add a drugstore as a tenant to the leased shopping center
provided that it obtain the financing to build the drugstore. Id. at 591. Market Street
Associates then contacted third-party lenders who demanded a mortgage on the property
as a precondition of any loan. Id. Market Street Associates could grant such a mortgage
only if it owned the property. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 592.
154. Id. at 591-92.
155. The Seventh Circuit (Judge Posner) remanded the case for a trial on the issue
whether Market Street Associates had tried to deceive the pension trust or whether Market Street Associates believed instead that the pension trust knew or would find out about
Paragraph 34 of the lease. Id. at 597-98. The court framed the issue similarly to the proposed rule herein:
The dispositive question in the present case is simply whether Market Street Associates tried to trick the pension trust and succeeded in doing so. If it did, this
would be the type of opportunistic behavior in an ongoing contractual relationship that would violate the duty of good faith performance however the duty is
formulated.
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Violation of this standard could also occur through defendant's
deliberate misrepresentation that induced plaintiff to surrender her
contractual rights. Assume in the previous case that, in response to
lessee's request for financing, lessor asked whether the lease covered
that subject. Lessee, knowing the truth, assured lessor that it did not.
If lessor relied on that deliberate misrepresentation and refused to
negotiate, lessee's conduct would violate the covenant.
It might appear unnecessary to extend this rule to misrepresentations since that conduct would be independently invalidated under the
doctrine of equitable estoppel.156 However, to establish equitable estoppel, plaintiff would have to prove that her reliance was justifiable. 15 7 Many courts hold that reliance is unjustified if the truth could
have been readily discovered. 158 In those jurisdictions, plaintiff could
not successfully claim estoppel based upon defendant's misrepresentations concerning the terms of the contract as plaintiff could have readfly ascertained the truth by reading the contract. 159
The more stringent reliance requirements of equitable estoppel
should not apply under this standard. The effect of this standard is to
protect plaintiff from surrendering a vested contract right, whereas the
doctrine of equitable estoppel also permits a party to acquire rights
that would not otherwise have existed.1 60 Greater constraints upon
Id. at 596.
156. Equitable estoppel usually requires an intentional misrepresentation by one party
that the other party justifiably relied upon to her detriment. See, e.g., Swinney v. General
Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 522-23 (6th Cir. 1995); Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund
v. Angelos, 839 F.2d 366, 366-70 (7th Cir. 1988); United Rubber, Cork Linoleum & Plastic
Workers v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 873 F. Supp. 1093, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1994); Young
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 898 P.2d 61, 66 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); Sisler v. Security
Pac. Business Credit Inc., 614 N.Y.S.2d 985, 988-89 (App. Div. 1994); Five Oaks Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Efirds Pest Control Co., 331 S.E.2d 296,297-98 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985);
Hughes v. Public Sch. Employees' Retirement Bd., 662 A.2d 701, 705 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1995); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Nissell, 871 P.2d 652, 655-56 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); see DAN
B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.3(5), at 85 (2d ed. 1993).
157. DOBBS, supra note 156, § 2.3(5), at 85.
158. "[O]ne may not assert estoppel based upon another's misrepresentation if the one
claiming estoppel had readily accessible means to discover the truth." Young, 898 P.2d at
66; accord Sisler, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 988-89 (quoting DiFilippo v. Hidden Ponds Assocs., 537
N.Y.S.2d 222,224 (App. Div. 1989)); Five Oaks, 331 S.E.2d at 297; Ticor, 871 P.2d at 656.
159. See, e.g., Young, 898 P.2d at 66; accord Sisler, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 988-89; Five Oaks,
331 S.E.2d at 298.
160. "Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is
absolutely precluded ... from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed . . . against another person ... who on his part acquires some corresponding right,
either of property, of contract, or of remedy." 3 J. POMEROY, EQurry JURISPRUDENCE,
§ 804 (5th ed. 1941), quoted in Waterville Homes, Inc. v. Maine Dep't of Transp., 589 A.2d
455, 457 (Me. 1991); Inlet Assoc. v. Asseteague House Condominium Ass'n, 545 A.2d
1296, 1307 (Md. 1988); Grand Lodge Indep. Order of Odd Fellows v. Marvin, 369 N.W.2d
54, 58 (Neb. 1985); Gonzales v. Gonzales, 867 P.2d 1220, 1228 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); R.J.
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deception should apply when the deception results in plaintiff's sur61
rendering preexisting contractual rights.'

(3)

PrecontractualNondisclosure of Contemplated Injurious Conduct

If at the time of the contract's formation, defendant had reason to
know but failed to disclose that he would engage in conduct that
might reasonably have induced plaintiff to forego entering into the
contract or to insist on altered terms, then defendant would violate
the covenant if he thereafter engaged in such conduct.
Although this standard does not impose a pre-formation duty of
disclosure upon defendant, his decision not to disclose relevant riskrelated information would restrict his post-formation ability to engage
in conduct whose permissibility is not resolved by the terms of the
contract. It is his pre-formation nondisclosure, coupled with the decision to exploit that nondisclosure, which should be regarded as a form
62
of dishonesty to be prohibited under the covenant of good faith.'
This standard is intended to promote defendant's disclosure of
risk-related information prior to the formation of the contract. As
noted, contract law encourages the obligee to disclose the consequences of breach. 63 The reason for encouraging that disclosure is to
afford the obligor the opportunity to assess intelligently the risks associated with the contract.' 64 The reasoning supporting disclosure in the
Hadley context, where nondisclosure protects the breaching party, is
even more compelling in cases covered by the proposed standard,
where nondisclosure protects the innocent party.
To avoid unnecessary burdens of disclosure, this standard should
apply only when disclosure might reasonably have induced plaintiff to
forego the contract or to insist on altering its terms. For example,
assume that a bank granted a line of credit to a borrower for a substantial origination fee.' 65 The contract conferred discretion on the
Betterton Management Servs., Inc. v. Whittemore, 769 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1989).
161. Affording greater protection for vested rights than for prospective rights is consistent with constitutional jurisprudence. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29-30 (1981)
("Evaluating whether a right has vested is important for claims under the Contracts or Due
Process Clauses which solely protect pre-existing entitlements.").
162. This conduct constitutes dishonesty in its broad sense. See supra note 59.
163. Such disclosure is encouraged by the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, which limits
consequential damages to those that were foreseeable to the breaching obligor at the time
of the formation of the contract. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
165. The example in the text is based on the facts of Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2 v.
First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990). On the actual facts, however, defendant bank
had made available a $300,000 line of credit for different consideration than the substantial
origination fee referred to in the text. The bank made the line available in order to achieve
priority over other claimants in the borrower's bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 1353-54.
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bank to terminate the line of credit. 166 Three days after entering into
the contract and collecting the origination fee, the bank terminated
the line of credit. 167 Had the borrower been aware of the bank's intention, it is reasonable to assume that she would have chosen to
forego the contract or to insist on limiting the bank's discretion to
terminate. The bank's immediate termination of the line of credit
without having disclosed the likelihood
of that termination would
therefore violate the covenant. 68
Conduct would not violate this standard unless at the time of formation defendant had reason to know that he would engage in that
conduct. In the line of credit case, the temporal proximity between
the formation of the contract and the bank's conduct makes it evident
that the bank had reason to know prior to the formation of the contract that it would terminate the line of credit. If, however, the termination had occurred two months later, it would be far more difficult to
establish this fact. In that case, the bank's decision could more plausibly be attributed to post-formation circumstances. 169
The following case is another illustration of this standard. Assume the Internal Revenue Service asserted a claim for unpaid taxes
against husband and wife. 70 Thereafter husband and wife separated,
and wife paid the entire claim to the I.R.S. The parties instituted divorce proceedings, and their property settlement agreement provided
that husband would pay wife a specified amount, which was understood by both parties to include a credit to wife for half the tax pay166. The contract establishing the line of credit provided for cancellation on five days'
notice. Id. at 1353.
167. In Kham & Nate's Shoes, the lender waited five weeks and then gave an additional
one week's notice of termination to the borrower. Id at 1354.
168. Contrary to the outcome proposed in the text, the Seventh Circuit (Judge Easterbrook) held that the lender did not violate the covenant of good faith when it exercised its
contractual discretion to cancel the line of credit so soon. According to the court, the
covenant of good faith did not block the use of terms, such as the cancellation term, that
actually appeared in the contract establishing the line of credit. Id. at 1357. According to
the court, the cancellation term should prevail because "[b]anks sometimes bind themselves to make loans ... and sometimes reserve the right to terminate further advances.
Courts may not convert one form of contract into the other after the fact .... " Id. at 135657. This reasoning ignores the possibility that the parties did not intend discretion to be
absolute. Only if the parties clearly intended discretion to be absolute should the protections of the covenant be deemed unavailing. See infra notes 191-99 and accompanying text.
169. Defendant would not be in violation of the covenant if he was induced to engage
in the conduct at issue for reasons independent of the undisclosed information. For example, there would be no violation when the bank failed to disclose prior to the formation of
the contract an intent to summarily terminate plaintiff's line of credit, and after the formation of the contract the bank discovered that plaintiff had supplied false financial statements, giving the bank an independent basis for termination.
170. The example in the text is a modified version of the facts of Neilson v. Beck, 881
F. Supp. 455 (D. Or. 1995).
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ment. Subsequent to the execution of the settlement agreement, wife
filed a claim with the I.R.S. pursuant to I.R.C. § 6013(a)(3) for an innocent spouse refund.17 1 The refund was granted to wife, causing husband to incur liability for the refunded taxes. If a court found that
wife intended at the time of the settlement agreement to file for the
refund, her nondisclosure, coupled with her filing for the refund,
would violate the covenant. Husband might reasonably have insisted
on a modification of the terms of the settlement agreement if he had
72
known of wife's intent to file.'
(4) Unconscionable Conduct
If an express term authorizing particular conduct would have
been unconscionable, then defendant would violate the covenant of
good faith by engaging in that conduct.
Under the doctrine of unconscionability, a court may invalidate
an unduly offensive contract term.1 73 If defendant engages in conduct
that is unduly offensive, and the contract is silent about the conduct at
issue, however, the conduct may not be invalidated under the doctrine
of unconscionability because there is no contract term to invalidate.
There would be an indefensible gap in the law if outrageous conduct
that was expressly authorized by the terms of the contract would be
found invalid while that same conduct would be permitted in the absence of such authorization. Defendant would be able to increase his
contractual rights by the simple expedient of silence. The proposed
rule closes that gap. It denies defendant the ability to engage in con171. Id. at 456.
172. Disclosure was an important aspect of the court's decision in Neilson v. Beck, 881
F. Supp. at 459. On the actual facts, Beck's (wife's) attorney had discussed with Neilson's
(husband's) attorney the possibility that Beck would file for a refund of taxes under the
innocent spouse provision. Id. at 456. The court emphasized this disclosure as an important reason why Beck's subsequent actions in obtaining a refund were not in violation of
the covenant of good faith. Framing the issue of good faith in terms of the parties' reasonable expectations, the court explained the effect of such a disclosure on Neilson's reasonable expectations as follows:
Neilson's attorney.., knew.., that Beck was considering applying for a refund.
Although it may have been reasonable for Neilson to have expected that the IRS
would not give Beck a refund under the innocent spouse provision, it was not
reasonable for Neilson to have expected that Beck would not pursue refunds of
the taxes she had paid.
Id. at 459.
173. The U.C.C. section on unconscionability authorizes a court to invalidate an unconscionable contract or clause. "(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or
any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause .... " U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1994). The court need not invalidate
an unconscionable clause, however, but may instead limit or modify it to avoid an unconscionable result. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 2 (1994).
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tractual deception by attempting to circumvent the ambit of the doctrine of unconscionability.
Many courts require both procedural and substantive unconscionability for a term to be invalidated. 74 Procedural unconscionability
is present, inter alia, when a party is surprised by the offending
term, 75 as when it is hidden in a prolix printed form. 176 When the
particular conduct at issue is not referred to in the contract, a term
permitting that conduct is not just hidden in the contract; it does not
exist. As a result, in cases governed by this standard, procedural unconscionability should never be an obstacle, and the focus should be
solely on whether the conduct, had it been expressed as a term, would
have been substantively unconscionable. A term is substantively un177
conscionable when it is so offensive as to shock the conscience.

Therefore, conduct that is so offensive as to shock the conscience
would violate the covenant. 78
Under this standard, courts will be forced to make case by case
decisions about whether conduct is unconscionable. However, this
174. See, ag., Phoenix Leasing Inc. v. Sure Broadcasting, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 138586 (D. Nev. 1994); In re Allen, 174 B.R. 293, 297 (Bankr. D. Or. 1994); Davis v. Suderov
(In re Davis), 169 B.R. 285, 304 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); LTV Energy Prods. Co. v. Northern
States Contracting Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 162 B.R. 949, 959-60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1994); Phoenix Baptist Hosp. & Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Aiken, 877 P.2d 1345, 1349 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1994) (quoting Pacific Am. Leasing Corp. v. S.P.E. Bldg. Sys., 730 P.2d 273, 280
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Spinello v. Amblin Entertainment, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 695, 698 n.6 (Ct.
App. 1994); Emlee Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Waterbury Transmission, Inc., 626 A.2d 307,
312 n.12 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993); Adams v. American Cyanamid Co., 498 N.W.2d 577, 590
(Neb. Ct. App. 1992); Master Lease Corp. v. Manhattan Limousine, Ltd., 580 N.Y.S.2d
952, 953-54 (App. Div. 1992); King v. King, 442 S.E.2d 154, 157 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994);
Collins v. Click Camera & Video, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1294, 1299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Planet
Ins. Co. v. Wong, 877 P.2d 198, 202 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). See generally Arthur A. Leff,
Unconscionabilityand the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 487
(1967) (delineating the distinction between procedural unconscionability and substantive
unconscionability).
175. The procedural component requires either oppression or surprise in connection
with a contract term. Oppression results when the term is not open to negotiation because
the party with superior bargaining power insists on its inclusion. Surprise exists when a
term is hidden so that a party is denied a reasonable opportunity to be aware of the term's
inclusion in the contract. See, e.g., Phoenix Leasing, 843 F. Supp. at 1385-86; Emlee Equip.,
626 A.2d at 312 n.12; Martin Rispens & Son v. Hall Farms, Inc., 601 N.E.2d 429, 443 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1992); Master Lease Corp., 580 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
176. Phoenix Leasing,843 F. Supp. at 1387; Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18
Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 565 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186
Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Ct. App. 1982)).
177. The substantive component of unconscionability requires that the term be so egregious in its operation against the oppressed or surprised party that it shocks the conscience
or is overly harsh. Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Wash. 1995); see also Clermont v. Clermont, 603 N.Y.S.2d 923, 924 (App. Div. 1993) (shocks the conscience); A & M
Produce Co., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122 (overly harsh).
178. This conduct would constitute dishonesty in its broad sense. See supra note 59.
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standard contains sufficient guidelines to narrowly restrict its application. Only in rare cases will conduct be deemed so outrageous that it
shocks the conscience. For example, this standard would govern the
following situation. 17 9 Plaintiff purchased a country store and private
residence from defendant, making a substantial down payment and
agreeing to pay defendant monthly installments for ten years. 180 Defendant could retake the property and keep plaintiff's payments upon
plaintiff's default on any installment. 181 Defendant retained a residence on the adjacent property. 182 After the sale, defendant, not liking plaintiff and seeking to take advantage of the forfeiture
provision, 183 made continual efforts to drive plaintiff off the property
by acts of intimidation and harassment. 184 If a term of the contract
had authorized such outrageous conduct, it would have been found
substantively unconscionable. 185 Consequently, the conduct would vi186
olate the covenant.

IV.

Waiver

18 7
Because the covenant of good faith is a gap-filling default rule,
the parties have the ability to indirectly waive its protections by expressly authorizing particular conduct. The question whether the cov-

179. The example in the text is based on the facts of Cenac v. Murry, 609 So. 2d 1257
(Miss. 1992).
180. Plaintiff Mrs. Cenae paid defendant Murry a down payment of $30,000 and agreed
to make monthly installments of $925 for ten years. Defendant retained title to the property. If all payments were made, then defendant would convey title to plaintiffs Mr. and
Mrs. Cenac. Id. at 1259.
181. Id. at 1259-60.
182. Id. at 1261.
183. According to the court, "Murry's motive is clear. With $30,000 in hand and
$925.00 monthly payments ...Murry would also get the store back, a healthy windfall, if
he could only drive the Cenacs out of town forcing a forfeiture of the contract." Id. at
1272.
184. The court agreed with plaintiffs that "Murry's abusive, aberrant, intimidating,
harassing behavior ... has made their life a living hell." Id. at 1272. Some of Murry's
tactics included roaming shirtless and beating his chest to drive away plaintiffs' customers,
interfering with plaintiffs' telephone calls by making loud noises, threatening to "get"
plaintiffs, firing a pistol near them, laughing at plaintiffs from nearby locations, mocking
them, and videotaping them. Id. at 1262-63.
185. A forfeiture clause providing that Murry could get the store back and keep the
Cenacs' payments if he could drive out the Cenacs through intimidation and harassment
would be substantively unconscionable. It would shock the conscience, and it would be
overly harsh. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
186. The court in Cenac v. Murry held that Murry's conduct violated the covenant of
good faith. It did not, however, adopt the above standard for evaluating that conduct. The
court articulated no standard at all, instead following its instincts. The court stated, "We
trust that the facts of this case establish Murry's breach of the good faith duty and have
nothing to add." Id. at 1272.
187. See supra notes 3, 5-8, and accompanying text.
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enant can be waived, therefore, arises only when the conduct at issue
is not expressly authorized and the contract attempts to bypass the
protections of the covenant either by expressly disclaiming its applicability or by conferring upon defendant the power to exercise his discretion without limits.
Of the courts that have addressed the issue, most,188 but not
1
89
all, have agreed that the covenant cannot be waived. 190 However,
the meaning of that proposition is unclear. If it is to have any meaning, a disclaimer clause stating that the covenant does not apply
should have no legal effect. There are independent substantive reasons for this conclusion. The conduct that would be prohibited by the
covenant is so insidious, so contrary to plaintiff's reasonable expectations, and so destructive of plaintiff's contractual purpose that a
sweeping attempt to validate all such conduct should, as a matter of
policy, be unenforceable. When, instead of a disclaimer of the covenant, the contract provides that a party will have absolute discretion
to engage in any conduct not prohibited by the terms of the contract,
that provision should be equally unenforceable for the same policy
reasons.
When the contract's terms convey to defendant absolute discretion with regard to a specified aspect of performance, such as absolute
discretion to open new franchises, relocate lessee operations under a
percentage lease, or terminate the contract, that specific grant should
be given effect. 191 If, for instance, defendant retained absolute discre188. See, eg., BA Mortgage & Int'l Realty Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
706 F. Supp. 1364, 1376 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d
669, 672 (Cal. 1995) (quoting Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 682
P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984)); Stark v. Circle K Corp., 751 P.2d 162, 166 (Mont. 1988);
Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445,450 n.4
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
189. See, e.g., Foster Enters. v. Germania Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 421 N.E.2d 1375,
1380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) ("There cannot be any doubt that a covenant of fair dealing and
good faith is implied into every contract absent express disavowal."); Cambridgeport Say.
Bank v. Boersner, 597 N.E.2d 1017, 1024 (Mass. 1992) (finding that a waiver of defenses
clause constituted a waiver of the covenant of good faith).
190. The U.C.C. specifically provides that "the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement . .. ."
U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1994). Courts have cited this section with approval. See, e.g., Kentucky
Utils. Co. v. South East Coal Co., 836 S.W.2d 392, 397 (Ky. 1992); Cadle Co. v. Wallach
Concrete, Inc., 897 P.2d 1104, 1110 (N.M. 1995); Eckstein v. Cummins, 321 N.E.2d 897,904
(Ohio Ct. App. 1974); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Lenape Resources Corp., 870 S.W.2d
286, 292 (Tex. 1993).
191. The rule that a grant of absolute discretion regarding a specific aspect of performance should be given effect is consistent with current case law. Big Horn Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988); accord Tymshare, Inc. v.
Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[I]t is possible to so draw a contract as to
leave decisions absolutely to the uncontrolled discretion of one of the parties and in such a
case the issue of good faith is irrelevant."); W. Alton Jones Found. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

tion to terminate plaintiff's distributorship, termination would not
constitute a violation of the covenant irrespective of the injury it
caused. 192 The policy reasons that make a generalized waiver of the
covenant unenforceable are not applicable in this context. Because
the area of unfettered discretion is contractually defined, plaintiff cannot reasonably argue that her contractual purpose or expectations are
undermined by defendant's exercise of that discretion. In the case of
defendant's termination of plaintiff's distributorship, plaintiff cannot
reasonably contend that her purpose was to have the contract continue indefinitely. Her purpose was to reap contractual benefits until
defendant decided, in his absolute discretion, to terminate her contin193
ued receipt of those benefits.
In these cases, the covenant would remain applicable to conduct
not encompassed within the defined area of absolute discretion. If
defendant accompanied the termination with a concentrated effort to
destroy plaintiff's reputation for the purpose of inducing customers to
cease dealing with plaintiff,194 that effort would not be encompassed
within the grant of discretion and would therefore be subject to the
195
covenant of good faith.
Courts, however, should be reluctant to interpret such a grant of
discretion as absolute. It should not lightly be inferred that the parties
intended to bypass the protections afforded by the covenant of good
faith. Only if the contract unambiguously evidences an intent by the
parties to make such discretion absolute, as would be the case where
defendant is given the power to exercise it "for any reason,"' 196 or
where his decision as to an aspect of performance shall be "final and

725 F. Supp. 712, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1989): MacDougald Constr. Co. v. State Highway Dep't,
188 S.E.2d 405, 407 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972).
192. See, e.g., Triangle Mining Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 753 F.2d 734, 739 (9th Cir.
1985); Highway Equip. Co. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 954, 958 (S.D. Ohio 1989),
affd, 908 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1990).
193. See, e.g., Highway Equip. Co., 707 F. Supp. at 957; Hejmadi v. Amfac, Inc., 249
Cal. Rptr. 5, 17-18 (Ct. App. 1988); see also infra note 198.
194. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 134-35 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979).
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conclusive,"' 197 or when the agreement is terminable at will,19 should
a court so conclude. 199
Although a grant of absolute discretion with regard to specific
conduct would waive the covenant of good faith, it would not deprive
the 200
courts of the ability to find that the conduct violated public policy.
In an employment contract terminable at will, for example, an
employer's decision to terminate an employee because of the employee's race may be held to violate public policy,201 and for that reason could be prohibited, irrespective of the fact that the covenant had
been waived.
197. See, e.g., Brandt v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 746, 749 (Ct.
App. 1984).
198. This approach is consistent with cases holding that if a contract is terminable at
will, defendant's exercise of the power of termination is not subject to the covenant of
good faith. See, e.g., Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1444 (7th Cir.
1992); Shelby v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 999, 1005-06 (M.D. Tenn. 1993); Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1363-64 (D.S.C. 1985);
Fletcher v. Wesley Medical Ctr., 585 F. Supp. 1260, 1263 (D. Kan. 1984); Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1041 (Ariz. 1985); Gould v. Maryland Sound
Indus., Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718, 727 (Ct. App. 1995); Metcalf. v. Intermountain Gas Co.,
778 P.2d 744, 749 (Idaho 1989) (quoting Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1041); Hunt v. IBM Mid
Am. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Minn. 1986); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 214 (N.D. 1987); Burk v. K Mart Corp., 770 P.2d
24, 26 (Okla. 1989).
199. A grant of authority allowing defendant to exercise his "sole discretion" regarding
an aspect of performance should not suffice. The term has an equivocal meaning. It is
possible the parties understood it to mean that defendant has unfettered discretion and is
not subject to the constraints of the covenant of good faith. It can also be understood to
mean that defendant has the exclusive power to determine the manner of performance but
is not free to ignore plaintiff's interests totally in deciding how to exercise that discretion.
Because of its ambivalent meaning, the covenant would be deemed to apply. This is consistent with how most courts have construed this term. See, e.g., Travellers Int'l v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 41 F.3d 1570, 1575 (2d Cir. 1994); BA Mortgage & Int'l Realty Corp.
v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 706 F. Supp. 1364, 1373 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Midwest
Management Corp. v. Stephens, 291 N.W.2d 896, 913 (Iowa 1980); Centronics Corp. v.
Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 193 (N.H. 1989); Resource Management Co. v. Weston
Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah 1985). Contra Patel v. Dunkin' Donuts,
Inc., 496 N.E.2d 1159, 1161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. D-Mart Food
Stores, Inc., 431 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
Courts have the power to prohibit or invalidate conduct that violates public policy,
regardless whether the conduct is authorized by the contract. While a grant of absolute
discretion regarding specific conduct would waive the covenant of good faith, it would not
deprive the courts of the ability to find that the conduct violated public policy. In an employment contract terminable at will, for example, an employer's decision to terminate an
employee based on the employee's race may be held to violate public policy, and for that
reason could be prohibited, irrespective of the fact that the covenant had been waived.
200. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1225 (Okla. 1992); Lockhart
v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 439 S.E.2d 328, 332 (Va. 1994); Federated Rural Elec.
Ins. Co. v. Kessler, 388 N.W.2d 553, 561 (Wis. 1986).
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V. Remedies
20 2
A violation of the covenant constitutes a breach of contract.
Whether the breach will entitle plaintiff to compensatory contract
damages 203 will depend on the nature of the violation. A court may
be able to prevent contractual injury to plaintiff by designating conduct as a violation of the covenant. In the case where shopping center
lessee violated the covenant by inducing failed negotiations in order
to invoke the lease term requiring a forced sale of the premises, the
effect of holding that conduct to violate the covenant would be to proplaintiff to maintain
hibit the invocation of the term, thereby allowing
204
ownership and avoid any compensable loss.
202. See Fasolino Foods Co. v. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 961 F.2d 1052, 1056 (2d
Cir. 1992); Fen Hin Chon Enters. v. Porelon, Inc., 874 F.2d 1107, 1114 (6th Cir. 1989):
Nelson v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 888 P.2d 1375, 1384 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Seubert v.
McKesson Corp., 273 Cal. Rptr. 296, 300 (Ct. App. 1990); Beco Constr. Co. v. City of
Idaho Falls, 865 P.2d 950, 956 (Idaho 1993); Cenac v. Murry, 609 So. 2d 1257, 1273 (Miss.
1992); Bijan Designer for Men, Inc. v. St. Regis Sheraton Corp., 536 N.Y.S.2d 951, 955
(Sup. Ct. 1989), affd, 543 N.Y.S.2d 296 (App. Div. 1989); Carmichael v. Adirondack Bottled Gas Corp., 635 A.2d 1211, 1216 (Vt. 1993).
203. In addition to contract damages, several jurisdictions impose tort liability in limited circumstances for violation of the covenant. Courts are especially inclined to impose
tort liability when an insurance company has violated the covenant. See, e.g., Messina v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F.2d 2, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1993); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1156-57 (Alaska 1989); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d
1032, 1036 (Cal. 1973); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Chemco, Inc., 833 P.2d 786, 792
(Colo. Ct. App. 1991), affd, 854 P.2d 1232 (Colo. 1993); Buckman v. People Express, Inc.,
530 A.2d 596, 599 (Conn. 1987); Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (Neb.
1991); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 904 (Okla. 1977); Staff
Builders, Inc. v. Armstrong, 525 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Ohio 1988); Viles v. Security Nat'l Ins.
Co., 788 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. 1990); Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 307
N.W.2d 256, 261 (Wis. 1981).
A few jurisdictions have extended tort liability beyond insurance contracts to cases in
which there is a special relationship between the parties. See, e.g., Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 776 (Mont. 1990); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Nev.
1987); Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 221 (Wyo. 1994). In
Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 679-80 (Cal. 1995), the California
Supreme Court limited tort liability to insurance contracts only, overruling Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984). See generally
Thomas A. Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, If at All, Should It
Be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?,64 MARO. L. REV. 425 (1981) (arguing that
tort remedies should apply when the breach was wilful and inefficient); Michael H. Cohen,
Comment, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
as a Tort, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1291 (1985) (arguing that tort remedies should extend beyond
special relationships and be available in all contracts); Sandra Chutorian, Note, Tort Remediesfor Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 377 (1986)
(arguing that tort remedies for breach of the covenant are ill-advised and inappropriate).
204. That was the result in Market Street Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588
(7th Cir. 1991); see supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text. Upon remand following the
above decision, the district court remedied defendant lessee's violation of the duty of good
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Frequently, however, compensatory damages are proper. Defendant's violation may injure plaintiff's contractual interests, necessitating monetary relief.20 5 Such- would be the case if the restaurant
franchisor, in breach of the covenant, opened a new franchise in such
close proximity to plaintiff as to materially injure her contractual interests. Plaintiff's monetary remedy would be for consequential damages stemming from her lost profits.
Consequential damages are ordinarily limited to those that were

foreseeable at the time of formation of the contract.206 When the covenant of good faith is violated, however, consequential damages
should include those that were foreseeable at the time of defendant's
breach. The proposed change in timing is based on a distinction between breach of the covenant and breach of the other terms of the

contract. With respect to those other terms, the parties generally
know at the time of formation the precise conduct that will constitute
a breach.20 7 Limiting damages to those foreseeable at the time of the
formation promotes the policy of allowing the parties to know the
risks they are assuming.20 8 Furthermore, breach of terms other than
the covenant may be inadvertent, occurring despite all reasonable efforts to prevent breach, 209 or may be justified by factors210
such as economic efficiency that make limited liability appropriate.
faith by refusing to grant specific performance of the mandatory purchase provision in
paragraph 34 of the lease. Market Street Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 817 F. Supp.
784, 788 (E.D. Wis. 1993), affd, 21 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 1994).
205. See supra note 202.
206. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1994); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351
(1979); 3 DOBBS, supra note 156, § 12.4(4).
207. With respect to express terms that forbid or require conduct, the parties necessarily know at the time of the contract's formation what conduct would constitute a breach of
those terms. With respect to implied terms such as the warranty of merchantability, the
parties have constructive notice of such terms and therefore know or have reason to know
what conduct would constitute a breach of those terms.
208. See supra notes 90-93, 163-64, and accompanying text.
209. See Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1050 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980) ("Fault is irrelevant to breach of contract. Whether one intentionally, carelessly,
or innocently breaches a contract, he is still considered to be in breach of that contract and
the extent of his liability is generally the same.") (quoted in Wait v. First Midwest Bank/
Danville, 491 N.E.2d 795, 802 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)); FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, § 12.8, at
875 ("[Cjontract law is, in its essential design, a law of strict liability, and the accompanying
system of remedies operates without regard to fault.").
210. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, § 12.3, at 845-49; POLINSKY, supra note 104, at
25-36; POSNER, supra note 92, at 104-07, 113-28 (contract law remedies have "the objective
of giving the promisor an incentive to fulfill his promise unless the result would be an
inefficient use of resources"); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract,Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RuTOERS L.J. 273, 284-86 (1970) (arguing that regulations for reasons of economic efficiency may be socially desirable); Frank J. Cavico, Jr.,
PunitiveDamagesfor Breach of Contract-A PrincipledApproach, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 357
(1990) ("In addition to permitting and encouraging contract parties to make efficient
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With respect to the covenant of good faith, however, the parties
cannot determine before entering into the contract what conduct will
constitute a breach because that determination depends on the circumstances as they exist at the time of the conduct. 2 11 The policy of
allowing the parties to know the risks they are assuming would not,
therefore, be promoted by limiting damages for breach of the cove-

nant to those that were foreseeable at the time of the contract's formation. Furthermore, unlike breach of the contract's other terms,
breach of the covenant under the proposed standards will always be

reasonably avoidable because it is never inadvertent. 212 Nor are violations of the covenant ever justifiable. 213 Therefore, there is no reason
to limit plaintiff's recovery merely because her losses could not have
been foreseen at the time of the contract's formation. This rule allows
plaintiff to receive compensation that approaches the extent of her
breaches, the law, by implication, should also deter inefficient breaches"; suggesting that
expansive liability be limited in a manner that only deters inefficient breaches); Diamond,
supra note 203, at 453-54; Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Consequential Damages
for Commercial Loss: An Alternative to Hadley v. Baxendale, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 665,
679-80 (1994); George K. Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts,
46 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32 (1932) ("The law affords only such remedies for breach of promise
as seem most likely to promote the orderly and efficient conduct of the community's economic life."); Andrew L. Merritt, Damages for Emotional Distress in Fraud Litigation:
Dignitary Torts in a Commercial Society, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1, 29 (1989) ("the law does not
wish to discourage 'efficient' breaches of contract"); Joseph H. Sommer, The Subsidiary:
Doctrine Without a Cause?, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 254 (1990) ("Contract law is
designed to foster efficient breach ....
").
211. There is one exception. When defendant's conduct violates the standard relating
to precontractual nondisclosure of contemplated injurious conduct, defendant will know at
the time of formation of the contract precisely what conduct will be in violation of the
covenant. Theoretically, therefore, under the nondisclosure standard, defendant's liability
should be limited to those damages that were foreseeable at the time of formation. However, defendant's nondisclosure, having prevented plaintiff from being able to assess her
risks at the time of formation, should disqualify him from arguing that the proposed expansion of liability is unfair in that it deprives him of an opportunity to accurately assess his
own risks.
212. Except for the standard prohibiting unconscionable conduct, all of the proposed
standards require either that defendant had reason to know of the circumstances that made
his conduct violate the covenant or that defendant engaged in deliberate deceit. Therefore, his violations are never inadvertent. As for the standard prohibiting unconscionable
conduct, defendant will not be found to violate the standard unless his conduct was on its
face manifestly unreasonable. See, e.g., Citizens Ins. Co. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 802
F.Supp. 133, 145 (W.D. Mich. 1992), affd, 15 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 1994); Long Island Lighting
Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1442, 1458 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Marriage
of Stadheim, 523 N.E.2d 1284, 1287 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988); Adams v. John Deere Co., 774
P.2d 355, 362 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989). Therefore, by the very nature of his conduct, defendant will have reason to know that his conduct is violative of this standard as well.
213. Breach of the covenant is never justifiable in that by definition conduct in violation of the proposed standards necessarily falls below minimum acceptable levels of cooperation or integrity.
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losses21 4 and deters impermissible conduct by requiring defendant to
take into account 215
post-formation circumstances affecting the consequences of breach.
As an alternative or supplement to compensatory damages, plaintiff may be able to enjoin defendant from violating the covenant
214. The trend in contract law is toward full compensation of losses.
As business conditions have changed, as profits have come to be recognized as
central to business value, and as economic analysis has shown that expectation
damages are both fair and efficient, the artificial limits classical contract law
placed on expectation damages and lost profits have gradually been falling away,
and contact law has been moving toward the goal of full compensation.
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REv. 563, 612
(1992).
The expectation measure of damages is the preferred measure under the U.C.C.,
which provides that its remedies should be interpreted so that "the aggrieved party may be
put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed." U.C.C. § 1-106(1)
(1994). Section 1-106(1) adds a caveat, however, that consequential damages may not be
had "except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law." U.C.C. § 1-106(1)
(1994). Section 2-715(2) of the U.C.C., which provides the standard for when consequential damages may be recovered under the Sales Article, has been interpreted as limiting
such damages to those that were foreseeable at the time of formation of the contract. See,
e.g., Troxler Elecs. Lab., Inc. v. Solitron Devices Inc., 722 F.2d 81, 84-85 (4th Cir. 1983);
Anna Ready Mix, Inc. v. N.E. Pierson Constr. Co., 747 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (S.D. 111. 1990);
Lenox, Inc. v. Triangle Auto Alarm, 738 F. Supp. 262,266 (N.D. 11. 1990); Sun-Maid Raisin
Growers v. Victor Packing Co., 194 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (Ct. App. 1983); Cricket Alley
Corp. v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 732 P.2d 719, 724-25 (Kan. 1987). Nonetheless, because
U.C.C. § 1-106 permits consequential damages as specifically provided by "rule of law," it
can be argued that a judicially created rule of law permitting recovery of consequential
damages for breach of the covenant of good faith to encompass those that were foreseeable at the time of breach would be in compliance with the U.C.C. See Roy Ryden Anderson, In Support of ConsequentialDamages for Sellers, 11 J.L. & COM. 123, 148 (1992)
(arguing that the "rule of law" provision of U.C.C. § 1-106(1) gives courts authority to
award sellers consequential damages despite the fact that U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) apparently
affords that remedy only to buyers).
This standard is similar to the tort standard of liability under which damages are recoverable if they were foreseeable at the time of defendant's tortious conduct. See, e.g.,
Perrin v. Hilton Int'l, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 296, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Rosh v. Cave Imaging
Sys., Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 136, 141 (Ct. App. 1994); Doe v. Sisters of the Holy Cross, 895
P.2d 1229, 1234 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995); Andrepont v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal
Dist., 602 So. 2d 704, 709-10 (La. 1992).
Although it is proper to expand liability for breach of the covenant of good faith, there
must be limits on plaintiff's recovery to avoid the disruptive and potentially catastrophic
consequences that could follow if defendant were required to compensate plaintiff for
damages that far exceeded what could have been contemplated at the time of breach. See
Diamond & Foss, supra note 210, at 700 n.157.
215. "[I]f further deterrence of willful breach is desired it will have to be accomplished
through expanded remedies for breach of contract." David Baumer & Patricia Marschall,
Willful Breach of Contractfor the Sale of Goods: Can the Bane of Business Be an Economic Bonanza?, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 159, 172 (1992). "Reinforcing the social practice of
contracting, however, may require supercompensatory liability to adequately deter contract breaches." Henry Mather, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract: The Case
of the PartiallyPerformingSeller, 92 YALE L.J. 14, 31 (1982).
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through the equitable remedy of specific performance. Plaintiff would
have to establish that the legal remedy was inadequate, 2 16 as would be
the case when damages from defendant's violation of the covenant
could not be measured with sufficient certainty. 217 Additionally, a
court will balance the equities in determining whether to grant specific
performance. 2 18 In ordinary contract breaches, a court may deny this
remedy if it would cause defendant to suffer undue hardship or would
cause injustice.2 19 Seldom, however, will the equities balance in defendant's favor when the breach involves a violation of the covenant
22 0
and unjustified, 22 1
of good faith. Such a breach is necessarily willful
and defendant would be unable to show that denying him the ability
to profit from his violation of the covenant would result in undue
222
hardship.
For example, if the franchisor's new restaurant would materially
injure plaintiff in violation of the covenant, she may be entitled to
enjoin the opening of that restaurant. Because the amount of damages plaintiff would incur is difficult to measure with sufficient certainty and because enjoining a willful, unjustified violation of the
covenant would not cause an undue hardship to defendant, the remedy of specific performance should be available.
216. See DoBBs, supra note 156, § 12.8(1). But see Douglas Laycock, The Death of the
IrreparableInjury Rule. 103 HARv. L. REV. 687 (1990) (suggesting that courts never allow
the requirement of irreparable injury to impede the grant of equitable relief).
217. See, e.g., Nemer Jeep-Eagle, Inc. v. Jeep-Eagle Sales Corp., 992 F.2d 430, 433 (2d
Cir. 1993); Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n, Inc. v. Shoshone River Power, Inc.,
874 F.2d 1346, 1354 (10th Cir. 1989); La Mirada Prods. Co. v. Wassall PLC, 823 F. Supp.
1403, 1415 (N.D. Ind. 1992); Cooper v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 725 P.2d 78, 80 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1986); Gold v. Ziff Communications Co., 553 N.E.2d 404,410 (I11.App. Ct. 1989);
Simon Home Builders, Inc. v. Pailoor, 357 N.W.2d 383, 385-86 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
218. See, e.g., Anderson v. Wooten, 549 So. 2d 40, 44 (Ala. 1989); Cutter Dev. Corp. v.
Peluso, 561 A.2d 926, 930 (Conn. 1989); Perkins v. Garcia, 551 N.E.2d 258, 261 (I11.App.
Ct. 1990); Stovall v. Watt, 610 P.2d 164, 167 (Mont. 1980); Lane v. Associated Hous. Developers, 767 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
219. See Kansas Baptist Convention v. Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership, 864 P.2d 204,
217 (Kan. 1993); Kopp v. Franks, 792 S.W.2d 413,420 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Stovall v. Watt,
610 P.2d 164, 167 (Mont. 1980); Oneida City Sch. Dist. v. Seiden & Sons, 576 N.Y.S.2d 442,
445 (App. Div. 1991); Barnes v. McKellar, 644 A.2d 770, 776 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
220. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
222. A court may also choose to deny specific performance for practical reasons, such
as when the contractual relationship demands too high a level of cooperation between the
parties to continue that relationship against one of the parties' will. See, e.g., Woolley v.
Embassy Suites, Inc., 278 Cal. Rptr. 719, 727 (Ct. App. 1991) (refusing to reinstate wrongfully terminated hotel manager); Chady v. Solomon Schechter Day Sch., 645 N.E.2d 983,
986 (I11.App. Ct. 1995) (refusing to reinstate wrongfully terminated elementary school
teacher); Goldfarb v. Robb Report, Inc., 655 N.E.2d 211, 219 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to reinstate wrongfully terminated franchisee).
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Conclusion
This article, in addition to resolving issues concerning waiver of
the covenant and remedies for its violation, has proposed a series of
specific standards to determine when conduct violates the covenant.
The proposed standards provide a structure that will substantially reduce the ad hoc decision making necessitated by current approaches.
Adoption of the proposed standards would not require the courts
to abandon the terminology of the current approaches; the standards
give content and meaning to the ambiguous terms utilized by those
approaches. Under the foregone opportunities approach, for example, conduct would be deemed a foregone opportunity only if it violated any of the proposed standards. Under the purpose approach,
conduct that violated any of the proposed standards would be deemed
inconsistent with the parties' contractual purpose. In the same manner, the proposed standards define what constitutes the reasonable expectations of the parties, the fruits of the contract, justice, commercial
reasonableness, and honesty.
The addition of the proposed standards will substantially reduce
the confusion surrounding the applicability of the covenant of good
faith. By diminishing the need for ad hoc decision making, the standards will allow parties to more intelligently assess the risks they are
undertaking and to adjust their conduct accordingly, thus reducing the
likelihood of breach and litigation. Although the standards may not
answer all questions regarding the scope of the covenant of good faith,
it is hoped that they will serve as a framework upon which a cohesive
body of rules can be established.

